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I. INTRODUCTION
When Justice Louis Brandeis observed roughly seventy-five years ago that
―a single courageous state may . . . serve as a laboratory‖ for ―novel social and
economic experiments,‖1 the main source of electricity in the United States
was coal.2 In its heyday, coal‘s dirtier attributes were overlooked by energy
consumers and policy makers, both of whom were more concerned and
satisfied with the fossil fuel‘s positive economic traits: abundant supply, low
cost, and transportability.3 Today, coal and other fossil fuels have fallen out
of favor with the American public, which has increasingly demanded access
to alternative energy sources that are not only economical but also
environmentally friendly.4
Perhaps with Justice Brandeis‘s refrain ringing in their ears, recently
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. History of Energy in the United States: 1635–2000: Coal, U.S. Dep‘t of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/eh/coal.html (last visited June 27,
2010). Coal was the leading source of energy in this country from 1885 to 1951, when it was
supplanted by crude oil and natural gas, and regained the top spot in the early 1980s. Id. Although
coal is no longer used to heat our homes or power our ships and trains, today it primarily is used to
generate electricity. Id. In fact, 92% of coal mined in the United States generates roughly half of the
country‘s electricity.
Id.; see also Energy Sources: Coal, U.S. Dep‘t of Energy,
http://www.energy.gov/energysources/coal.htm (last visited June 27, 2010).
3. Melanie Warner, Is America Ready to Quit Coal?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at BU1.
4. Energy Policy Has Initial Support; Impact on Jobs, Cost Looks Crucial, ABC
News/Washington Post Poll, Aug. 28, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/
1093a4Energy.pdf (noting that ―[p]rice sensitivity‖ is ―central to the debate‖ regarding the United
States‘ energy policy overhaul). Eighty-seven percent of respondents to a 2007 poll believed that
―using renewable energy sources, like solar and wind power, to generate electricity is a good idea
because they are readily available and better for the environment.‖ Americans‘ Views on the
Environment,
CBS
News/New
York
Times
Poll,
April
26,
2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/042607environment.pdf [hereinafter Americans‘ Views]. On
the other hand, only 43% of survey participants thought continued use of coal as an energy source is
prudent, compared to 48% who felt it is a ―bad idea.‖ Id.
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legislators in a majority of states have ―courageous[ly]‖ responded to their
constituencies with ―novel . . . experiments‖ in alternative energy policy,5
namely through renewable portfolio standards (RPSs).6 In many states, RPS
policies have been used to spur public and private development of land-based
wind power generation facilities.7 In fact, many states see wind power as an
increasingly essential element in their energy portfolios.8 That being said,
while a few states have investigated the potential of offshore wind projects, or
wind farms,9 none have actually erected wind turbines in their waters.10
5. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311. Among the experimental incentives state legislatures have used
to entice private renewable energy development are ―tax credits and exemptions, rebates, grants,
loans, green-labeling requirements, green power purchasing programs, and tradable renewable
certificates, in the form of green tags or renewable energy credits.‖ Carolyn S. Kaplan, Congress, the
Courts, and the Army Corps: Siting the First Offshore Wind Farm in the United States, 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 177, 188 (2004).
6. Information Resources: States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. Dep‘t of Energy,
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/
states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm [hereinafter States with Renewable Portfolio Standards]
(last visited June 27, 2010). By January 2010, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia had
instituted RPS policies. LARRY FLOWERS, NAT‘L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., WIND ENERGY
UPDATE
21
(2010),
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/pdfs/wpa/
wpa_update.pdf. A relatively new concept, an RPS sets a deadline by which electricity retailers are
required to purchase a minimum percentage of their power from renewable energy resources. States
with Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra; see also Christopher E. Cotter, Comment, Wind Power
and the Renewable Portfolio Standard: An Ohio Analysis, 32 DAYTON L. REV. 405, 423–26 (2007).
Taken together, states with RPS policies account for more than half of the electricity sales in the
United States. States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra. In addition, six more states—
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Virginia, and Vermont—have nonbinding goals
for adoption of renewable energy. WIND ENERGY UPDATE, supra, at 21.
7. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 425–26. Although the efficacy of RPS policies has been
debated, it is undisputed that they ―provided the impetus behind 47% of new wind development in
the United States‖ between 2001 and 2005. Id. at 426; see also Robert J. Michaels, National
Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 101–10
(2008) (concluding that the latter is true, citing California‘s inability to enforce RPSs and the dearth
of conclusive data regarding RPS compliance in states such as Texas, Pennsylvania, and Colorado as
predictive of the likely inefficacy of a national standard).
8. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 177–78.
9. The term ―wind farm‖ is also commonly used to refer to wind projects. In this Comment, the
author occasionally will use the terms interchangeably.
10. See Kaplan supra note 5, at 189–92. Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass‘n, Statement by
the American Wind Energy Association on the NYPA Fresh Water Offshore RFP (Dec. 2, 2009),
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/releases/12-2-09_NYPA_Fresh_Water_
Offshore_RFP.html (commenting on the New York Power Authority‘s request for proposals to
construct wind farms generating up to 500 megawatts in Lakes Erie and Ontario) [hereinafter NYPA
Fresh Water Offshore RFP]. The U.S.‘s first offshore wind farm likely will begin construction in
2010 or 2011 and will be located approximately twelve miles off the coast of Delaware. Steve Gelsi,
NRG Energy Sees Offshore Wind Revenue by 2014, MarketWatch (Nov. 10, 2009),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nrg-energy-eyes-offshore-wind-revenue-by-2014-2009-11-10;
Danielle Ulman, Delaware PSC Approves Nation’s First Offshore Wind Farm, DAILY RECORD
(Balt.),
Aug.
1,
2008,
http://mddailyrecord.com/
2008/07/31/delaware-psc-approves-nations-first-offshore-wind-farm/; Danielle Ulman, Rehoboth
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But in many places, the winds of change are blowing. No longer are the
continental coasts seen as the only viable sites for offshore wind development.11
Increasingly, energy policy makers are turning their attention to the Great
Lakes.12 On January 15, 2009, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin
(PSCW) released its final report of a yearlong study assessing the potential for
offshore wind power generation in Lakes Michigan and Superior.13 Despite
much anticipation, the study‘s results were inconclusive, at best.
On one hand, the PSCW found that it is ―technologically feasible‖ to
generate electricity from wind turbines sited in the middle of Lake
Michigan.14 On the other hand, the report also conceded that there are a
number of ―significant technical, economic, environmental, and legal issues to
resolve.‖15 Because no entity has ever built an offshore wind farm in United

Wind Farm Project Moves Closer with Delmarva Power Deal, DAILY RECORD (Balt.), June 24,
2008,
http://mddailyrecord.com/2008/06/23/rehoboth-wind-farm-project-moves-closer-withdelmarva-power-deal/. However, individuals involved with the Delaware project would be wise to
heed the lessons of Cape Wind, which had long been expected to be the country‘s first offshore wind
farm. Guy R. Martin & Odin A. Smith, The World’s Largest Wind Energy Facility in Nantucket
Sound? Deficiencies in the Current Regulatory Process for Offshore Wind Energy Development, 31
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 285, 286 (2004). Originally proposed in 2001, the Cape Wind project was
supposed to begin delivering power to 500,000 customers living on Cape Cod and the islands of
Nantucket Sound, Massachusetts, by 2005. Id.; Elizabeth A. Ransom, Note, Wind Power
Development on the United States Outer Continental Shelf: Balancing Efficient Development and
Environmental Risks in the Shadow of the OCSLA, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 465, 468–69 (2004).
Recently, Cape Wind‘s developers predicted they could begin construction of their 130-turbine wind
farm in 2010, even though the project must overcome a number of remaining obstacles. See infra
note 129.
11. Ransom, supra note 10, at 467, 468 n.20. Private developers are attracted by the Outer
Continental Shelf‘s (OCS) ―shallow waters and sustainable winds,‖ both of which are ideal for
profitable wind energy development. Id. at 467. By 2004, one company had proposed no less than
―eighteen total projects in federal and state waters off the coast of Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia,‖ illustrating the OCS‘s popularity as a potential wind farm
site. Id. at 468 n.20; see also Kaplan, supra note 5, at 190; Adam M. Dinnell & Adam J. Russ, The
Legal Hurdles to Developing Wind Power as an Alternative Energy Source in the United States:
Creative and Comparative Solutions, 27 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 535, 544 (2007).
12. See, e.g., NYPA Fresh Water Offshore RFP, supra note 10; Sean Ryan, Wisconsin Tests
Water for Wet Wind Farms, DAILY REPORTER (Milwaukee, Wis.), Apr. 8, 2008, at 1A; Bob Matyi,
Ohio Commissioners Begin Study of Wind Farm to Be Developed in Lake Erie Near Cleveland,
GLOBAL POWER REP., Jan. 17, 2008, at 14.
13. Press Release, Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of Wis., PSC Issues Final Report on Great Lakes Wind
Energy Study (Jan. 15, 2009), http://psc.wi.gov/pdffiles\News Releases\2009\01 January\
wowfinalreportrelease.pdf.
14. STUDY GROUP, GOVERNOR‘S TASK FORCE ON GLOBAL WARMING, PUB. SERV. COMM‘N
OF WIS., HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES: AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION INTO GREAT
LAKES
WIND
DEVELOPMENT
9
(2009),
http://psc.wi.gov/apps/erf_share/view/viewdoc.aspx?docid=106801
[hereinafter
HARNESSING
WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES].
15. Id.
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States waters, let alone the Great Lakes, the several legal issues raised by the
PSCW report are questions of first impression.
This Comment aims to address the PSCW‘s most significant legal
concerns related to the development of offshore wind farms in Lakes
Michigan and Superior, particularly whether and how the existing Wisconsin
and federal regulatory schemes would accommodate offshore wind farm
development.16 Part II offers a general history and overview of wind projects,
beginning in Part II.A with a glimpse at the well-established and successful
European wind industry. This subpart also details two bold European policy
initiatives: (1) the European Union‘s 2009 Renewable Energy Directive,17
which established a comprehensive renewable energy regulatory system based
on principles of extensive coordination and cooperation among various
governmental entities, and (2) the United Kingdom‘s Planning Act 2008,18
which considerably streamlined the permitting process for substantial national
infrastructure projects such as large wind farms, but whose central permitting
authority has been typecast as being undemocratic and authoritarian. Then,
Part II.B highlights the upstart success of and growing support for land-based
wind farms in the United States. This subpart concludes by pointing to the
potential benefits and challenges presented by offshore wind projects this side
of the Atlantic Ocean, drawing comparisons and contrasts between the two
continents‘ systems.
Part III attempts to untangle the labyrinth of current federal and state
regulations pertinent to offshore wind power development in Lakes Michigan
and Superior. Part IV critically assesses the efficacy of this complex
regulatory framework, in two steps. First, Part IV.A identifies opportunities
for Wisconsin state legislators to directly address offshore wind energy in the
Great Lakes while simplifying the state‘s current regulatory scheme. Next,
against the backdrop of congressional debate on the nation‘s future energy
policy, Part IV.B discusses opportunities for federal–state collaboration in
efforts to develop the Great Lakes region‘s renewable energy industries,
generally, and offshore wind, specifically. In an effort to provide policy
makers with both fresh ideas and cautionary advice, Part IV also refers to
European wind power policy successes and failures. Finally, Part V closes
with an exhortation to the Wisconsin Legislature to enact exhaustive
legislation that addresses the state‘s pressing energy concerns and lays the
foundation for long-term economic security through fostering the wellordered development of an offshore wind energy industry.
16. Id. at 17–18.
17. Council Directive 2009/28/EC, On the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable
Sources, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 17 [hereinafter 2009 Renewable Energy Directive].
18. Planning Act, 2008, c. 29 (Eng.).
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II. AN AERIAL VIEW: THE HISTORY OF WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT
Harnessing the power of the wind is anything but a new concept. In fact,
historical records show that humankind began using wind power as early as
the third or second century B.C.E.19 Windmills peppered the pastoral
European landscape by the eleventh or twelfth century.20
Fast-forward nearly a millennium, and an entirely different scene comes
into view. Modest wooden windmills used long ago to pump water or grind
grain have been replaced by sleek steel and fiberglass structures that generate
electricity.21 Wind turbines, as they are now called, can be seen on both
European lands and waters. Led by the pioneering efforts of Germany and
Denmark, which installed the world‘s first offshore wind farm in 1991,22
historically the European Union (EU) has set the pace for innovations in wind
power development.23 In 2009 alone, new installations in EU member nations
accounted for more than 10.2 gigawatts (GW) of additional power-generating

19. Iva Ziza, Note, Siting of Renewable Energy Facilities and Adversarial Legalism: Lessons
from Cape Cod, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 591, 599 (2008).
20. Id.
21. Windmill World, History of Windmills, http://www.windmillworld.com/windmills/
history.htm (last visited June 27, 2010); Am. Wind Energy Ass‘n, Wind Web Tutorial: Wind Energy
Basics, http://www.awea.org/faq/wwt_basics.html [hereinafter Wind Energy Basics] (last visited
June 27, 2010). Wind energy is generated when solar radiation heats different parts of the earth at
different rates, creating variations in the atmosphere‘s temperature. Wind Energy Basics, supra. As
hot air rises, atmospheric pressures at the earth‘s surface are reduced and cool air is drawn in to fill
the void left by the escaping hot air, resulting in wind. Id. Wind turbines capture the kinetic energy
of the wind, and the power systems to which the turbines are connected convert this captured wind
energy into electrical energy that can be harnessed by utility companies for use in homes and
businesses. Id. Although there are two basic designs of wind turbines—vertical-axis, or ―eggbeater‖ style, and horizontal-axis, or propeller-style, machines—horizontal-axis wind turbines are
more commonly erected for use as ―utility-scale‖ turbines, which have a power-generation capacity
of 100 kilowatts (kW) or more. Id. Most wind turbines currently on the market tout power ratings
ranging from 250 watts to 5 megawatts (MW). Id. The steel and concrete towers for these turbines
can range in height from 150 to 300 feet, and feature fiberglass-reinforced polyester or wood-epoxy
rotors of roughly the same length. Id. Utility-scale wind turbines are most efficient when grouped
together into wind farms generating at least 660 kW, and must be sited in locations featuring
minimum wind speeds of 13 miles per hour. Id. Within the United States, the Great Plains has the
potential to function as the mecca of wind farm development, boasting an abundance of sites in
several states, including Texas, Iowa, Oklahoma, and North and South Dakota, featuring sustained
wind speeds of at least 15 miles per hour. See U.S. Department of Energy, Wind Powering America,
Wind
Maps
and
Wind
Resource
Potential
Estimates,
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_maps.asp (last visited June 27, 2010); see also Joseph
O. Wilson, Note, The Answer, My Friends, Is in the Wind Rights Contract Act: Proposed Legislation
Governing Wind Rights Contracts, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1780–81 (2004).
22. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 188; HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra
note 14, at 193.
23. GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, GLOBAL WIND 2008 REPORT 30 (2009),
http://www.gwec.net/fileadmin/documents/Publications/Global Wind 2008 Report.pdf.
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capacity.24 That year, the EU‘s cumulative wind power-generating capacity
reached
an
all-time
high
of
74.8
GW,
a
nearly
eight-fold increase from the year 2000.25 According to the European Wind
Energy Association, in 2009, wind projects represented more than 39% of all
new power-generation installations in the EU.26
Recently, the popularity of wind power has expanded from Europe to
countries all over the globe, including Australia, China, Egypt, India, and the
United States.27 Now, wind power is widely seen as the fastest-growing
renewable energy resource in the world.28 The industry‘s growth is largely
attributable to the implementation of innovative renewable energy regulatory
schemes throughout Europe, home to some of the most ―aggressive
government policies promoting green energy,‖ including wind power.29
Some of these policies have been widely accepted, while others have been
derided as undemocratic. The next section will discuss in turn the successes
and failures of European wind power policy.
A. The Bold Country: Europe’s Wind Power Regulatory Scheme
1. Model Citizens: The European Union‘s Cooperative Approach
Over the past two decades, the ―old country‖—that is, the EU and its
twenty-seven member nations—has boldly led the world in renewable energy
policy making. As early as the 1980s, lawmakers in Denmark were proposing
legislation to promote private investment in renewable energy industries.30

24. EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASS‘N, WIND IN POWER: 2009 EUROPEAN STATISTICS 8 fig.3.1
(2010),
http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea_documents/documents/statistics/general_
stats_2009.pdf. One GW is the equivalent of 1,000 MW.
25. Id. at 9 fig.3.3.
26. Id. at 3, 6.
27. Dinnell & Russ, supra note 11, at 567, 575–78. Nevertheless, the 66 GW of wind power
generated on the European continent in 2008 represented 55% of the global totalthe twenty-seven
EU member nations accounted for 65 GW of the continent‘s total wind power-generating capacity.
GLOBAL WIND 2008 REPORT, supra note 23, at 13.
28. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 5, at 178–79; Rusty Russell, Neither Out Far Nor in Deep:
The Prospects for Utility-Scale Wind Power in the Coastal Zone, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 221,
225 (2004). Global wind energy capacity nearly tripled in only four years, from 47,317 MW of
capacity available at the end of 2004 to 120,798 MW in 2008. Compare Dinnell & Russ, supra note
11, at 565, with GLOBAL WIND 2008 REPORT, supra note 23, at 9 tbl.1. In slightly less time, global
investment in wind energy more than tripled, from $14 billion worth of installed facilities in 2005 to
approximately $50 billion worth of new generating equipment in 2008. Compare Dinnell & Russ,
supra note 11, at 565, with GLOBAL WIND 2008 REPORT, supra note 23, at 3.
29. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 189; see also GLOBAL WIND 2008 REPORT, supra note 23, at 30.
30. EWEA Chief: EU Legislation Set to Boost Wind Industry (Euractiv.com), Jan. 21, 2009,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/ewea-chief-eu-legislation-set-boost-wind-industry/
article-178688 [hereinafter EWEA Chief] (interviewing a European wind power industry lobbyist
who outlined the basic historical development of Europe‘s renewable energy industries).
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The German and Spanish governments followed soon after.31 By the new
millennium, wind power and other renewable energy sources had garnered the
support of the then-fifteen-member EU, which passed a Renewables Directive
in 2001.32 The legislation‘s stated goal was to increase the EU‘s percentage of
electricity produced from renewable energy sources to 21% by 2010.33
Although the Directive contained only voluntary, as opposed to mandatory,
―national indicative targets,‖34 it served as the foundation for subsequent
renewable energy production standards throughout the continent.35
The Renewables Directive also gave EU member nations the freedom to
implement the ―[s]upport schemes‖ or mechanisms of their choice to meet
their renewable energy production targets.36 Giving the EU member nations
such ample discretion could have proven inefficient, or worse—particularly if
a country chose to implement a strategy directly counter to the Directive‘s
core policy goals. Such inefficiency can be demonstrated by an example
taken from the early days of the 2001 Renewables Directive, when EU
member nations still were learning how to overcome and dispense with
administrative barriers within their own borders. Initially, before a wind farm
project in Greece could have proceeded, it required approval from forty-one
different organizations (including a television station), each of which had the
power to veto the project.37
However, what resulted was a diverse mix of innovative regulatory
schemes tailor-made for each nation‘s specific needs and market tolerances.38
31. Id.
32. Council Directive 2001/77/EC, On the Promotion of Electricity Produced from Renewable
Energy Sources in the Internal Electricity Market, 2001 O.J. (L 283) 33 [hereinafter 2001
Renewables Directive].
33. 2001 Renewables Directive, supra note 32, at 35. As enacted, the Directive originally
required 22.1% of the EU‘s electricity to come from renewable energy sources. Id. But with the
EU‘s expansion in 2004 from a fifteen-member body to a twenty-five-member organization, this goal
was slightly revised down to 21%. See Council Decision, 2003 O.J. (L 236) 15–16 (EU) (admitting
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and
Slovakia into the EU on May 1, 2004); The Share of Renewable Energy in the EU: Commission
Report in Accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2001/77/EC, Evaluation of the Effect of Legislative
Instruments and Other Community Policies on the Development of the Contribution of Renewable
Energy Sources in the EU and Proposals for Concrete Actions, at 11, COM (2004) 366 final (May
26, 2004).
34. 2001 Renewables Directive, supra note 32, at 35.
35. See EWEA Chief, supra note 30.
36. 2001 Renewables Directive, supra note 32, at 35–36.
37. EWEA Chief, supra note 30. Ostensibly, Greek officials have learned their lesson and long
since centralized such veto power in only one or several governmental bodies.
38. See GLOBAL WIND 2008 REPORT, supra note 23, at 30; see also Commission Staff Working
Document on the Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources: Accompanying Document
to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Promotion of
the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources, at 4–6, COM (2008) 19 final (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter
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Some countries employed price-based market instruments such as feed-in
tariffs to help sustain renewable energy operations. Used in eighteen EU
member nations, feed-in tariffs and premiums are regulated by the government
and allocated to ―operators of eligible domestic renewable electricity plants for
the electricity they feed into the grid.‖39 The government pays all producers a
fixed price per unit of electricity produced (the feed-in tariffs), but individual
producers are given an incentive to produce additional electricity to earn
competitively awarded premiums, or bonuses. By guaranteeing participating
producers a tariff subsidy for a long-term period of ten to twenty years, the
government can reassure skittish industry investors—that is, at least until the
upstart renewable electricity market establishes itself.40
Other nations relied on quantity-based market instruments. Seven EU
member nations employed quota obligations, usually in the form of tradable
green certificates.41 Under this system, governments obligate consumers,
suppliers, or producerssubject to penaltyto obtain or produce a certain
percentage of their electricity from renewable energy sources. Renewable
electricity producers sell their electricity at market price, but also are allowed
to sell green certificates authenticating the renewable source of their
electricity. Suppliers can prove they have met their obligation by purchasing
green certificates from renewable electricity producers.42
Thanks in large part to the Renewables Directive and led by the efforts of
member nations such as Denmark, Germany, and Spain, in the first half of the
last decade the EU cemented its status as the world leader in wind power
development.43 At one point, the EU could boast of a 32% average yearly
increase in wind power-generating capacity, and 22% annual growth in terms
of new wind farm installations.44 But by 2007, the major barriers to industry
growth that had long been present in most EU countries—project
authorization delays and inequitable access to and slow integration with
Commission Staff Working Document] (providing an overview of the ―great range of market-based
instruments governments use to subsidise renewable electricity‖). Market-based instruments that
provide operating (instead of investment) support for renewable electricity producers are either
quantity-based (they fix a quantity of renewable electricity to be produced) or price-based (they fix a
price to be paid for renewable electricity). Commission Staff Working Document, supra, at 4–5.
39. Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 38, at 5.
40. Id. Over the past five years, Portugal has put in place such a feed-in tariff program and
revamped its national electricity grid to better accommodate renewable energy transmission,
demonstrating the advantages and drawbacks of converting a country‘s energy program from a fossil
fuels-based system to one reliant on renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power. See
infra Part IV.B.1.
41. Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 38, at 5.
42. Id.
43. GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, GLOBAL WIND 2005 REPORT 16 (2006),
http://www.gwec.net/uploads/media/Global_WindPower_05_Report.pdf.
44. Id.
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electric power grids—had begun to take their toll on even the EU‘s leading
wind power producers.45 Dragged down by lackluster expansion in Portugal
and Germany, the latter of which experienced a 25% drop-off in its rate of
new wind power-generating capacity from 2006 to 2007, the EU‘s annual
market growth rate sagged to a respectable 12%.46 Meanwhile, the global
market expanded by 31%, led by remarkable growth in the United States.47
Enter the EU‘s renewable energy and climate change package, or the ―20
20 by 2020‖ plan.48 Proposed by the European Commission in January 2008,
the plan built upon the framework of prior policy statements and laid out both
short- and long-term strategy for EU energy policy, including renewable
energies.49 Understanding the intricate relationship between the immediate
need to check increases in greenhouse gas emissions and the enduring goal of
creating sustainable economic growth, the Commission recognized a unique
―opportunity‖ and proclaimed 2007 a ―turning point for the European Union‘s
climate and energy policy.‖50 The Commission put forward a plan under
which 20% of the EU‘s energy consumption would be derived from
renewable energy sources by 2020.51 The ―legally binding‖ plan would hold
each of the EU‘s member nations responsible for doing its part to help the
group meet that target through implementing ―national action plan[s]‖ that
would outline each member nation‘s agreed renewable energy consumption
target and the measures to be used to reach that goal.52 Notably, the proposal
also contained measures that addressed the long-standing barriers to wind
energy development,53 including grid access issues.54 After a few revisions, in
45. GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, GLOBAL WIND 2007 REPORT 30–31 (2008),
http://www.gwec.net/fileadmin/documents/test2/gwec-08-update_FINAL.pdf.
46. Id. at 7, 30.
47. Id. at 6, 30.
48. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Promotion
of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources, at 2, COM (2008) 19 final (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter
Proposal for a Directive]; 20 20 by 2020: Europe’s Climate Change Opportunity, at 1, COM (2008)
30 final (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter 20 20 by 2020] (memorandum introducing the proposal and
outlining two key goals: to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% and achieve a 20% share of
renewable energy consumption by the year 2020). Incidentally, the European Commission is the
EU‘s equivalent of the United States‘ Executive branch, while the Parliament and Council are more
akin to the Legislative branch‘s House of Representatives and Senate, respectively. Europa: The EU
at a Glance, How Are We Organised?, http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/howorganised/index_en.htm
(last visited June 27, 2010). Together, the European Parliament and Council share the responsibility
of enacting EU legislation, or directives. Id.
49. 20 20 by 2020, supra note 48, at 3–5. Another central component of the plan included a
redesigned continental emissions trading system. Id. at 5–6.
50. Id. at 2; see also Proposal for a Directive, supra note 48, at 2.
51. 20 20 by 2020, supra note 48, at 2.
52. Id. at 2, 7.
53. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
54. Proposal for a Directive, supra note 48, at 31.
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December 2008 government officials from EU member nations, the European
Parliament, and the European Commission agreed to adopt the ―landmark‖
plan.55 The Renewable Energy Directive became law in April 2009, thus
binding all EU countries to the 20 20 by 2020 plan‘s renewable energy
targets.56
2. A (Too) Simple Plan?: The United Kingdom‘s Planning Act 2008
The EU‘s Renewable Energy Directive appears to have spurred at least
one of its member nations into action. Even as the 2008–09 economic
recession retained its grip on global credit markets, including those relied on
to finance wind power projects,57 former British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown announced an ambitious offshore wind power initiative and awarded
contracts to companies that will construct thousands of wind turbines along
7,500 miles of British coastline.58 The plan to construct nine offshore wind
farms, which will generate up to 25 GW of power and cost an estimated
$120 billion to implement, is intended to help Britain satisfy its commitment
under the Renewable Energy Directive to generate 15% of its energy from
renewable sources by 2020.59
Although none will begin construction until 2014,60 undoubtedly Brown
had hoped that some of these offshore wind farms currently being planned
would benefit from the United Kingdom‘s Planning Act, indirectly inspired
by the EU‘s Renewable Energy Directive and passed into law in November
2008.61 The Act consolidated the permitting process for ―nationally

55. Ian Traynor & Allegra Stratton, Leaders Agree 20% 2020 Renewable Energy Target,
GUARDIAN
(London),
Dec.
10,
2008,
at
25,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/dec/09/climatechange-energy. Before the 20 20 by
2020 plan ultimately was adopted, disagreement over two contentious points jeopardized the
legislation‘s success. Id. While one group of nations insisted that biofuel energy sources comprise
10% of transportation fuel by 2020, Italy tried to slip in an escape clause that would have ordered a
review of renewable energy progress in 2014 and allow any countries failing to make mandated
progress to revise down its goals. Id. In the end, the 2014 review date was retained, but without any
provision allowing for target revisions. Id. Most important, the renewable energy quotas also
survived. Id.
56. 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, supra note 17, at arts. 3–4. For a detailed analysis of
how the Renewable Energy Directive has affected wind energy development in Europe, see Tyler
Hagenbuch, Note, Establishing an Aggressive Legal Framework for the Future of Wind Energy in
Europe, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1595 (2009).
57. Lars Kroldrup, Wind Power in Europe Grows, but Credit Remains Tight, Green Inc.,
http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/wind-power-in-europe-grows-but-credit-remains-tight/
(Feb. 3, 2010, 10:15 EST).
58. Landon Thomas Jr. & Robert P. Walzer, Thousands of Wind Turbines Coming to British
Seas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at B4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Planning Act, 2008, c. 29 (Eng.).
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significant infrastructure project[s],‖ including offshore wind farms
generating more than 100 MW of power.62 Eliminating ―eight bureaucratic
regimes,‖ the Act replaced them with a single Infrastructure Planning
Commission (IPC) that is independent of the U.K. government.63 Despite its
independence, the IPC is required by the Planning Act to issue permits to
infrastructure projects that comport with ―national policy statements‖ crafted
by the secretary of state for communities and local government, and that are
subsequently debated and approved by Parliament.64 As conceived in the Act,
these statements are to represent the U.K.‘s ―strategic blueprints for replacing
[its] aging and overloaded infrastructure,‖ and are intended to ―balance local
concerns with the needs of the country.‖65 Only after providing several
opportunities for ―public consultation and special parliamentary scrutiny‖ may
the IPC adopt and implement a national priority statement.66 Working under
the guidance of this framework, the IPC is tasked with assessing the social,
economic, environmental, and technical merits of each project application,
and is authorized to reject infrastructure projects that it considers falling short
of the applicable national priority statement.67 Notably, even before it accepts
an application, the IPC requires a project developer to engage extensively
with and receive approval from stakeholders of the community in which the
developer proposes to build.68
Before the Planning Act existed, on average it took twenty-four months
for a wind farm project to receive government permission to proceed.69 Now,
because government officials do not have to ―reinvent[] the wheel‖ each time
they are presented with a new project application,70 industrial experts believe
62. Id. §§ 14–15.
63. Hazel
Blears,
Building
Up
to
Better
Plans,
Joe
Public
Blog,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/joepublic/2008/nov/05/planning-bill-blears (Nov. 5, 2008, 12:11
GMT) [hereinafter Better Plans] (penned by the U.K.‘s former secretary of state for communities and
local government, who suggested that by creating ―one streamlined system that can make fair
decisions more quickly[, m]any wind farms will get faster approval. Overall the country could save
up to [300 million pounds] a year.‖); see also Planning Act sched. 1, § 21 (outlining status
requirements of commissioners); IPC Commissioners‘ Code of Conduct (Interim),
http://infrastructure.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/
Commissioners-Code-of-Conduct.pdf (last visited June 27, 2010).
64. Better Plans, supra note 63; Planning Act § 5.
65. Better Plans, supra note 63; Planning Act § 5.
66. Better Plans, supra note 63; Planning Act §§ 5, 7.
67. Better Plans, supra note 63; Planning Act § 5; see also Infrastructure Planning
Commission:
Guide
to
Its
Role
and
Operation
5–6,
10,
14
(2009),
http://infrastructure.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/The-IPC-A-guide-to-its-Roleand-Operations.pdf.
68. Infrastructure Planning Commission: Guide to Its Role and Operation, supra note 67, at 16–
21.
69. GLOBAL WIND 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 63.
70. Siobhan Kennedy & Francis Elliott, CBI Warns of Power Cuts if Planning Bill Is Defeated,
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that the Planning Act could provide for more efficient yet responsible
permitting of wind farm projects in coming years, which they say is necessary
if the U.K. is to meet its mandated renewable energy targets by 2020.71
That is, if the Planning Act and the IPC were to survive that long. Barely
eight months after beginning operations and less than two months after a new
British coalition government ousted Brown and his Labour Party from
power,72 the IPC was unceremoniously discarded, the news announced by a
government press release.73 On the same day the IPC was sidelined without
its having reviewed even one project application, the U.K. government
announced plans to temporarily shift major infrastructure planning decisions
to government ministers and to eventually enact legislation to replace the
Planning Act and formally close the IPC.74 Meanwhile, the development of
final national policy statements that were to be debated by Parliament in the
spring of 2010 has been indefinitely postponed.75
Before it was effectively terminated, the IPC had long been a target of
Tory leaders who ―[saw] the IPC as anti-democratic and an arm of the state,
created to minimise dissent [regarding major public infrastructure projects]
and ride roughshod over public opinion.‖76 Editorialists in at least one leading
British newspaper echoed these sentiments, derogatorily referring to the IPC
as merely another quasi-nongovernmental organization, or quango, that is
―excessively bureaucratic, authoritarian, unaccountable and staffed by people
who are paid too much and often demonstrate a woeful lack of competence.‖77
TIMES
(London),
June
24,
2008,
at
15,
available
at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4200817.ece.
71. Nick Clark, “Lights Will Go Out” by 2015 if [House of] Lords Rejects Planning Bill,
INDEPENDENT
(London),
July
14,
2008,
at
38,
available
at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/lights-will-go-out-by-2015-if-lords-rejectsplanning-bill-866957.html (quoting deputy director of a leading U.K. business trade lobby who
maintained that ―[t]o keep the lights on, heat our homes and meet climate change targets,
approximately [£100 billion] needs to be invested in major energy infrastructure projects by 2020‖).
72. Infrastructure
Planning
Commission,
Message
from
the
Chair,
http://infrastructure.independent.gov.uk/?page_id=8 (last visited June 27, 2010); John F. Burns,
Tories in Britain Reclaim Power with a Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A1.
73. Press Release, Planning Quango Closes, U.K. Dep‘t for Communities and Local Gov‘t
(June 29, 2010), http://www.communities.gov.uk/newsstories/newsroom/1626268.
74. Press Release, Major Infrastructure Stays on Fast-Track as Planning Quango Closes, U.K.
Dep‘t
for
Communities
and
Local
Gov‘t
(June
29,
2010),
http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/corporate/1626220.
75. Robin Pagnamenta, Nice Offices, Lavish Pay and Lots of Staff but Quango Is Still Waiting
to
Start
Work,
TIMES
(London),
Jan.
28,
2010,
at
26,
available
at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7005417.ece; Major Infrastructure Stays on
Fast-Track as Planning Quango Closes, supra note 74.
76. Peter Hetherington, Power Struggles, GUARDIAN (London), July 15, 2009, at 1, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/jul/15/quango-fast-tracks-controversial-projects.
77. Editorial, Another Quango for the Bonfire, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 1, 2009,
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The IPC‘s abrupt exit may have been undeserved, especially considering
that the Commission was never given a true opportunity to demonstrate its
ability to genuinely involve local stakeholders in infrastructure project
planning. To that end, the IPC episode could be instructive for U.S. policy
makers contemplating whether and how to reform Wisconsin and federal
regulatory schemes to streamline project permitting processes and encourage
offshore wind farm development.78
B. Wind Power Development in the United States
1. Rookie Success: Boom Times for Land-Based Wind Projects
In this century, the U.S. has been at the forefront of global wind power
development. The country‘s wind power industry installed more than a
quarter of the world‘s new wind energy-generating capacity in 2007 and grew
at an average rate of 29% from 2002 to 2007.79 Shortly after the U.S. wind
industry surpassed the 20,000-MW installed-capacity milestone in 2008,80 as
expected it supplanted Germany as the world leader in terms of total installed
capacity.81 Today, the total installed capacity in the U.S. tops 35,000 MW.82
According to the American Wind Energy Association, ―strong demand
[and] favorable economics‖ have been largely responsible for the U.S. wind
power industry‘s ―remarkable and accelerating growth.‖83 Among the states,
Texas leads the way with 9,410 MW of installed capacity.84 In Texas, twenty
at 25, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/6475363/The-InfrastructurePlanning-Commission-another-quango-for-the-bonfire.html.
78. See infra Part IV.A.
79. Am. Wind Energy Ass‘n, Wind Energy Fast Facts (2007), http://awea.org/
newsroom/pdf/Fast_Facts.pdf; GLOBAL WIND 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 8, 10.
80. Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass‘n, U.S. Wind Energy Installations Surpass 20,000
Megawatts
(Sept.
3,
2008),
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/releases/Wind_
Installations_Surpass_20K_MW_03Sept08.html (noting that 20,000 MW, or 20 billion watts, is
enough power to supply 5.3 million households).
81. Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass‘n, American Wind Energy Association Notes Top Wind
Industry
Accomplishments
of
2008
(Dec.
22,
2008),
http://awea.org/newsroom/
releases/Year_End_Wrap_Up_22Dec08.html; GLOBAL WIND 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 8.
82. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS‘N, AWEA YEAR END 2009 MARKET REPORT 2 (2010),
http://www.awea.org/publications/reports/4Q09.pdf. Amazingly, the U.S. wind industry has tripled
in size in only three years. Id. For comparison‘s sake, it had taken two decades for the industry to
reach the 10,000 MW mark in 2006. U.S. Wind Energy Installations Surpass 20,000 Megawatts,
supra note 80.
83. GLOBAL WIND 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 6.
84. Am.
Wind
Energy
Ass‘n,
U.S.
Wind
Energy
Projects:
Texas,
http://awea.org/projects/Projects.aspx?s=Texas (last visited June 27, 2010). With respect to wind
power, the timeworn adage that everything‘s bigger in Texas rings true. The Lone Star State is home
to the world‘s two largest wind farm installations, the Roscoe Wind Complex, which is spread over
100,000 acres and features 627 wind turbines generating up to 781.5 MW, and the Horse Hollow
Wind Energy Center, which boasts 421 wind turbines spread across 47,000 acres and a total
generating capacity of 735.5 MW. World‘s Largest Wind Farm Churns in Texas, CBSNews.com
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new wind farms comprised of nearly 1,400 turbines came online in the year
2009 alone.85 Trailing Texas in wind power development are Iowa and
California, with 3,670 MW and 2,794 MW of total generation capacity,
respectively, and eleven more states each generating more than 1,000 MW of
wind power.86
If only 2.1% of its contiguous ―windy land area‖ were dedicated to wind
power development, the U.S. would have the ability to supply enough power
to meet 20% of the country‘s current electricity consumption.87 Interestingly,
the U.S. Department of Energy does not consider ―water features‖ to be ideal
for wind power development,88 lending credence to the notion that the
―potential for extensive wind energy development and production . . . remains
largely untapped.‖89
2. In Too Deep?: Venturing Into the Unfamiliar Territory of Offshore Wind
Farms
Currently, wind projects are relied on to supply merely 1.9% of the
electricity consumed in the U.S., even though realistically wind energy could
satisfy up to 20% of the country‘s electricity demand.90 Wind power has yet to

(Oct.
2,
2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2009/10/02/tech/livinggreen/main5358287.shtml; NextEra Energy Resources, Horse Hollow Wind
Energy
Center,
www.nexteraenergyresources.com/content/where/portfolio/pdf/
horsehollow.pdf (last visited June 27, 2010).
85. U.S. Wind Energy Projects: Texas, supra note 84.
86. AWEA YEAR END 2009 MARKET REPORT, supra note 82, at 4. Those states are
Washington (1,980 MW), Minnesota (1,809 MW), Oregon (1,758 MW), Illinois (1,547 MW), New
York (1,274 MW), Colorado (1,246 MW), North Dakota (1,203 MW), Oklahoma (1,130 MW),
Wyoming (1,101 MW), Indiana (1,036 MW), and Kansas (1,014 MW). Id. Incidentally, Wisconsin
ranks seventeenth nationwide in terms of wind power-generation capacity, with 449 MW. Id.
87. Compare U.S. Energy Information Administration: Independent Statistics and Analysis,
Electricity
Explained:
Data
&
Statistics,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/
index.cfm?page=electricity_home#tab2 (last visited June 27, 2010) (noting that U.S. electricity
consumption in 2008 equaled 3,906,443 GWh), with U.S. Department of Energy, Wind Powering
America, Estimates of Windy Land Area and Wind Energy Potential (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/docs/wind_potential_80m_30percent.xlsx (reporting a wind
energy-generation potential of 36,919,551 GWh on 26.89% of the country‘s ―windy land area,‖
which consists of the most suitable areas for wind power development within the contiguous fortyeight states, excluding locations deemed unsuitable for development, such as wilderness areas, parks,
urban areas, and wetlands).
88. Estimates of Windy Land Area and Wind Energy Potential, supra note 87.
89. Dinnell & Russ, supra note 11, at 542.
90. See U.S. Department of Energy, Wind Powering America, Wind Powering America Update
(Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/filter_detail.asp?itemid=746; U.S. DEP‘T OF
ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY‘S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S.
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 1–2 (2008), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/41869.pdf
[hereinafter 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030].
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be entirely exploited because of a ―complex interplay of factors‖91 running the
gamut from the practical (capital investment costs)92 to the environmental
(effects on bats and migratory wildlife)93 to the personal (noise and visual
aesthetics) impact of wind farms.94 These obstacles have proven particularly
crippling to the offshore wind farm sector, which has yet to get off the ground
in the U.S.,95 despite a host of latent advantages over land-based wind projects.
a. Potential Benefits
Many of the United States‘ windiest sites—and thus, most ideal locations
for wind turbines—are found in the Great Plains states or other western parts
of the country.96 However, because these sites generally are located in remote
areas that lack ready access to power transmission lines, high costs are
required to transport the energy generated by remotely located wind turbines
to load centers near populous regions.97
Discussions regarding siting of offshore wind farms generally focus on
the East and West coasts, home to ―more than half of the U.S. population.‖98
But according to the U.S. Census, 34 million people reside in the Great Lakes
Basin, including more than 10 million people who make their homes in the
five states bordering Lakes Michigan and Superior.99 Unlike remotely located
land-based facilities that must transfer power across hundreds of miles of
plains, large-scale wind farms that likely would be located anywhere from
five to twenty miles off the shores of Lakes Michigan and Superior have great
potential to serve as regional load centers.100 The PSCW study group found
that ―Wisconsin‘s existing transmission system along Lake Michigan could
support the development of off-shore wind projects smaller than 600 MW [if]
located near a city[,] without substantial upgrades to the transmission
system.‖101
91. ROBERT Y REDLINGER ET AL., WIND ENERGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, at xiii (2002).
92. An initial hurdle to wind farm projects is the high cost of constructing miles of transmission
lines from the wind farm sites themselves, many of which are located in remote areas of the Great
Plains, to load centers near populous areas. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 190.
93. See generally Cotter, supra note 6, at 420–21.
94. See generally id. at 417–20 (internal citations omitted).
95. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
96. See Wind Maps and Wind Resource Potential Estimates, supra note 21.
97. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 190.
98. Id.
99. Great Lakes Information Network, People in the Great Lakes Region: Populations of the
Great
Lakes
Basin
(2000–2001),
http://www.great-lakes.net/envt/flora-fauna/
people.html (last visited June 27, 2010). Population figures for the entire Great Lakes Basin are
based on 2000 U.S. Census data, and include an estimate of 10 million Canadians residing in an
undetermined number of provinces in the region. Id.
100. See HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 13–14.
101. Id. at 12.
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As mentioned earlier, offshore wind power offers a clean, sustainable
alternative to fossil fuel sources of electricity.102 And while much attention
should be given to offshore wind power‘s ability to generate renewable
energy, policy makers would be wise not to ignore the potential to use
offshore wind farms to generate jobs, as well. Land-based wind projects have
been shown to create jobs in the U.S., generally, and in Wisconsin,
specifically.103 The U.S. wind power industry reportedly created 35,000 jobs
in 2008 alone, increasing the total number of people employed in the industry
to 85,000.104 If the offshore wind industry takes root in the Great Lakes
region, Wisconsin potentially could enjoy ―new and increased manufacturing
and export opportunities‖ in the wind power components industry as well as
the shipbuilding industry.105 Reports commonly identify Wisconsin as one of
a handful of states well positioned to experience job growth in the wind power
industry, in large part because of the state‘s ―manufacturing infrastructure,
skilled workforce, and academic support community.‖106 One such report by
the U.S. Department of Energy forecast a hypothetical scenario in which the
United States would derive 20% of its electricity from wind power in 2030.107
Upon compiling a list and map of existing U.S. industries ―that make some of
the 8,000 components and piece parts . . . used to construct a typical wind
turbine,‖ the Energy Department concluded that Wisconsin was ―one of the
ten states that would benefit most in terms of job growth.‖108
Already, Wisconsin‘s manufacturing workers are benefiting from expanded
opportunities, courtesy of recent announcements that two wind turbine
component manufacturers are constructing new manufacturing facilities in
Wisconsin. First, on February 5, 2010, a central Wisconsin manufacturer of
complex composite structures, vessels, and processing systems for clean
technology applications announced that it would break ground in March 2010
on a 535,000-square-foot wind-turbine blade plant expected to employ 600
workers.109 Less than two weeks later, a Spanish company caused a stir when it
102. See discussion supra Part II.
103. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 171–72.
104. Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass‘n, U.S. Wind Energy Industry Welcomes Second
Round of Renewable Energy Grants from Depts. of Treasury, Energy (Sept. 22, 2009),
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/releases/Wind_Energy_Industry_Welcomes_Second_
Round_of_Renewable_Energy_Grants_092209.html.
105. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 172.
106. Id.
107. Id.; 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030, supra note 90, at 7–8.
108. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 172; 20% WIND
ENERGY BY 2030, supra note 90, at 208.
109. Nathaniel Shuda, Wind-Energy Plans Move Ahead, DAILY TRIBUNE (Wisconsin Rapids,
Wis.), Feb. 6, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.wisconsinrapidstribune.com/article/
20100206/WRT0101/2060643/Wind-energy-plans-move-ahead.
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selected Milwaukee as the location over nearly eighty other cities for its new
wind-turbine generator manufacturing facility, expected to begin construction in
April 2010 and employ 275 workers by 2015.110
But the potential economic benefits of offshore wind power extend far
beyond the manufacturing employment marketplace. Offshore wind project
development in the Great Lakes also could create ―new jobs in construction
and installation near project locations‖ and, as has taken place in Europe,
could help boost the economies of marine industry-based port cities such as
Sheboygan and Green Bay.111 In addition, there is much potential to create
well-paying jobs in supporting sectors, such as tourism, ―engineering,
construction, transportation, and financial services.‖112
Another benefit of offshore wind farms is that the winds they harness
typically are ―stronger and less turbulent than land-based winds,‖ increasing
their revenue-generating potential.113 Although an offshore location presents
additional construction and maintenance costs,114 such costs can be offset by
consistent energy production resulting from predictable wind conditions.115
The winds likely to be produced off the Wisconsin shores of Lakes Michigan
and Superior range from 16 to 20 miles per hour, wind speeds that are more
than ample to support a utility-scale wind farm.116
Predictable wind conditions over water offer an ancillary benefit: reduced
wind shear, which results in less wear and tear to turbine components.117
Therefore, offshore wind farms can be designed to last for fifty years, instead
of the ―twenty to twenty-five years typical for land-based installations.‖118 In
110. Larry Sandler, Energy Firm Picks Milwaukee for Plant, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Feb. 16, 2010, at 1A; Thomas Content & Tom Daykin, Electric Motor Expertise Sold Spanish Firm
on Milwaukee, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 17, 2010, at 1A.
111. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 172.
112. Id.; see also Nathaniel Shuda, Energy Composites Project Expected to Be “Incredible
Boost,” DAILY TRIBUNE (Wisconsin Rapids, Wis.), Feb. 9, 2010, at 3, available at
http://www.wisconsinrapidstribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=20102090623 (predicting that the
―residual effects‖ of construction of a 535,000-square-foot wind-turbine blade manufacturing plant in
Wisconsin Rapids will benefit local real estate agents, building contractors, financial advisers, and
retailers).
113. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 191.
114. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 13–14.
115. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 191.
116. See supra note 21; HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 55.
Because there are only two buoys in Lake Michigan, both of which are located in the ―middle of the
lake rather than closer to shore where wind energy projects might be built‖ and ―measure wind
speeds at heights much lower than wind turbines,‖ the PSCW study group declined to make
definitive assertions as to wind speeds over the lake‘s waters. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY
RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 54. Therefore, the wind speed ranges cited are ―assumed mean wind
speeds for . . . a typical wind turbine height of 90 meters.‖ Id.
117. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 191.
118. Id.
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exchange for submitting to higher upfront costs, investors in offshore wind
projects can take advantage of longer amortization periods.119
The simple fact that offshore wind projects are located on water instead of
land introduces several advantages. First, because offshore wind turbines can
be and are often larger than land-based turbines,120 they ―have the potential to
produce power on a larger scale, and thus may be more economical.‖121
Moreover, offshore wind farms ―can be built near population centers without
facing the [land use] problems commonly associated with close proximity to
homes and other buildings.‖122 Last but certainly not least, wind turbines that
are situated far enough offshore are unlikely to provoke complaints regarding
aesthetic concerns.123
b. Controversies and Challenges
i. A Cautionary Tale: The Cape Wind Project
With respect to offshore wind farms, aesthetics are no insignificant matter.
They are believed to be the primary reason behind the near-death (several
times over) of what long ago was widely expected be the nation‘s first
offshore wind project.124 The now-infamous Cape Wind saga has been mired
in nearly a decade of pitched battle, as played out in the courts and the
press.125 Local residents and government officials have repeatedly challenged
the federal government‘s authority to permit a private energy company to
construct a 130-turbine wind farm off the coast of Massachusetts in the waters
of Nantucket Sound126—but only five miles from the town of Hyannis on
Cape Cod, home to the Kennedy family compound.127 Several Native
119. Id.
120. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 35–37.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Dinnell & Russ, supra note 11, at 544.
123. See id. at 544.
124. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 203–05 & n.162.
125. Katharine Q. Seelye, Big Wind Farm Off Cape Cod Gets Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2010, at A1.
126. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 197.
127. Id. at 192. Jay Wickersham, Sacred Landscapes and Profane Structures: How Offshore
Wind Power Challenges the Environmental Impact Review Process, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 325,
329
(2004)
(quoting
a
letter
written
by
former
Sen.
Edward
Kennedy
(D-Mass.) to a Cape Cod newspaper, in which he said that ―although the project needed to receive
‗enough state and federal scrutiny to justify its going forward, . . . so far . . . [it] hasn‘t met that test, and
I doubt they ever will‖) (citation omitted); Ocean Wind Farm Advances, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan.
17, 2009, at 3A (noting that ―Kennedy, whose family‘s Hyannis Port compound would have a clear
view of the [wind] farm, has tried to derail the project in Congress, citing . . . the sanctuary of Nantucket
Sound‖). Despite the various reasons given, at the end of the day Senator Kennedy had what some
commentators undoubtedly would refer to as a bad case of NIMBY (Not in My Back Yard) syndrome,
or NIMBYism. See Lisa A. Kelley, Comment, The Power of the Sea: Using Ocean Energy to Meet
Florida’s Need for Power, 37 ENVTL. L. 489, 512–13 (referring to the Cape Wind project, among
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American tribes were among the most recent opponents of the Cape Wind
project, claiming the wind turbines would obstruct their ocean view during
sunrise greeting ceremonies.128 Nevertheless, in April 2010 the federal
government at long last ―gave the green light‖ to the Cape Wind project,
which is expected to help jumpstart the United States‘ burgeoning offshore
wind industry.129
ii. Other Potential Concerns
Wisconsin has its share of Not in My Back Yard, or NIMBY,
detractors,130 although perhaps they are not quite as vehement as the Cape
Wind opponents. But in addition to facing aesthetic concerns, wind farm
proponents need to be prepared to gather sufficient information before
addressing the public‘s questions regarding offshore wind farms‘ impact on
the environment, human activities, cost and technological capabilities, and the
local and regional economy.
Offshore wind projects‘ potential impact on Great Lakes ―wildlife and
aquatic life, including migratory birds, bats, and fisheries,‖ is undoubtedly of
―primary concern[]‖ to many Wisconsin residents.131 Although ―many species
of migratory birds and bats are known to follow the Great Lakes during peak
migration periods,‖ less is known about their specific patterns of movement
near or over the Great Lakes, and whether such flight patterns would come
close to or interact with offshore wind turbines.132 Similarly, until a wind
farm is sited and underwater transmission lines are laid on the lakebeds, it is
others).
128. Editorial, Winds of Change: Interior Secretary Ken Salazar Can Give Greener Energy a
Needed Push Off Cape Cod, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2010, at A18.
129. Seelye, supra note 125.
130. See Ryan, supra note 12, at 1A; Kari Lydersen, Wisconsin Feels Turbulence Over Pulling
Power from Air; State Finds More Opposition Than Expected to Wind Turbines, WASH. POST, Apr. 12,
2008, at A2; see generally John S. Hingtgen, Offshore Wind Farms in the Western Great Lakes: An
Interdisciplinary Analysis of Their Potential (2003) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of WisconsinMadison),
www.mrec.org/Wind_Energy/Hingtgen%20Wind%
20Thesis%2004.pdf (surveying residents of lakeshore counties and finding that they generally prefer
onshore to offshore wind farms).
However, given several recent environmental scares significantly impacting essential U.S. water
bodies, including Lake Michigan and the Gulf of Mexico, Wisconsin residents could be forgiven for
being particularly protective of their Great Lakes. See Dan Egan, Asian Carp Discovered: No Plan
to Close Locks Despite Discovery Near Lake Michigan, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 24, 2010, at
1A; Emma Graves Fitzsimmons, Michigan Governor Warns of Spill Threat, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2010, at A13 (reporting an 800,000-gallon oil spill into the Kalamazoo River, a major waterway that
feeds Lake Michigan); Justin Gillis, U.S. Report Says Oil that Remains Is Scant New Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at A1 (estimating that through July 2010, 4.9 million barrels of oil had spilled
from a seafloor well into the Gulf of Mexico following the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion on
April 20, making it the largest marine oil spill disaster in history).
131. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 15.
132. Id.
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difficult to determine the ―effects of off-shore wind turbines on fisheries and
aquatic life.‖133 In some circumstances, ―wind turbine structures could be
designed to enhance habitat for some fish species,‖134 similar to manmade
sunken coral reefs used in other parts of the world. Other factors that will
need to be considered include the ―location of sensitive habitat such as
spawning reefs, lake currents, aquatic invasive species, contaminated
sediments, submerged logs, electromagnetic fields, noise, as well as the
potential for spills of hazardous materials.‖135
Offshore wind projects also could impact ―Great Lakes cultural and
historic sites, commercial and recreational fishing, commercial and
recreational navigation, air traffic, and communications.‖136 The negative
impact of such projects could be minimized through careful site selection so
as to avoid disturbing ―prehistoric and historic communities along the margins
of the Great Lakes, . . . historically significant shipwrecks,‖ or areas of
―religious and historical‖ significance to the region‘s Native American
communities.137 Moreover, project site studies should endeavor to protect the
economic interests of commercial, tribal, and recreational fisheries in Lakes
Michigan and Superior, currently valued at more than $1 billion.138 Efforts
also should be made to reduce interference with the Great Lakes‘
transportation and communications infrastructure, including air traffic,
recreational boating, navigation channels used by the Army Corps of
Engineers, and ―various electronic signals and modes of communication,
including radar and ship-to-ship communications.‖139
Because an offshore wind project has yet to be constructed in the U.S.,140
at present there are only estimates of the cost to design, build, and operate an
offshore wind farm in the Great Lakes. Although most of the offshore
projects that have been built in Europe are smaller than 100 MW, many
insights can be gained by referring to these examples.
Factors that may increase the cost of offshore wind power relative to other
sources include worldwide demand for wind turbine components and
materials, which has ―driven up prices by as much as 85% since 2002.‖141
Second, construction costs for offshore wind turbines likely will be higher
than for comparable land-based facilities, especially given the challenges of
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 13.
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placing turbine foundations in lake waters as deep as 150 feet.142 Finally,
―operations and maintenance costs for offshore wind turbines at European
installations are higher than [those at] comparable land-based installations.‖143
These added costs stem from the need for specialized personnel, vessels, and
equipment that may not be available in the U.S. or are in high demand
worldwide, as well as the additional time required for crews to reach offshore
project sites and the increased premium costs to insure against the additional
hazards presented by operating offshore.144
Likely adding to the cost of an offshore wind project is the need to
develop a new or enhance the Great Lakes‘ existing transmission
infrastructure, comprised of both onshore and offshore facilities, to transport
the power generated by the wind turbines to nearby energy markets. 145 At
most European installations, ―offshore turbines are connected by underwater
cables to an offshore collector substation, which increases the voltage prior to
sending electricity to shore.‖146 Transmission voltage requirements depend on
a wind project‘s size, the distance between the substation and shore, and the
voltage of the connecting transmission system.147 Sometimes, one or more
offshore substations are needed, and their components usually need to be
mounted above the water‘s surface on a foundation similar to the type used to
support turbines.148 Offshore substations would need to be connected to the
onshore transmission grid via one or more medium, high, or extra-high
voltage cables, depending on the amount of power generated by the
turbines.149 These cables either could be buried in the lakebed or placed
directly on the bottom of Lakes Michigan and Superior.150
While ―Wisconsin‘s existing transmission system along Lake Michigan
could support the development of off-shore wind projects smaller than
600 MW [if] located near a city[,] without substantial upgrades to the
transmission system,‖151 projects of a larger scale likely would ―require more
substantial upgrades to the existing transmission system, including the
develop[ment] of new transmission lines.‖152 This is one leading reason why
―Wisconsin‘s transmission needs should be viewed in the context of larger
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See generally id. at 25–35, 39–41.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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regional plans and trends,‖ such as the possible ―transmission of windgenerated power from the Great Plains to the eastern United States [and] the
adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards by other states,‖153 should
Wisconsin position itself to sell excess electricity to out-of-state customers.
Finally, as the global economy struggles to pull itself out of a sustained
recession, some policy makers may be curious to learn just how investing in
the development of a utility-scale wind power project currently could make
financial sense. On the one hand, 2009 was a ―banner year‖ for the entire
U.S. wind power industry, and industry observers predict significant growth
throughout this decade, particularly for offshore wind, both here and
abroad.154 On the other hand, that growth is not expected in the U.S. until at
least 2014.155 Moreover, much of the development experienced recently was
attributable to either the federal government‘s stimulus package,156 which
bailed out the wind power industry with a tax credit extension and other
investment incentives, or to wind turbine orders placed in early 2008, before
the economic crisis slowed manufacturing to a crawl.157 All things
considered, wind power proponents are less concerned with a potential lack of
public support than they are with a lack of political support for renewable
energy policies that encourage private investment in wind power
development.158
Therefore, for the long term the most critical questions may be (1)
whether companies interested in making wind power a central component of
their renewable energy portfolios can afford to wait out the credit crunch, and
(2) whether state and federal government policy makers will create regulatory
environments conducive for such companies to invest in wind power when
they are finally well positioned to do so.

153. Id.
154. Jad Mouawad, Wind Power Grows 39% for the Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at B1;
Sindya
N.
Bhanoo,
Report
Predicts
Offshore
Wind
Boom,
Green
Inc.,
http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/report-predicts-offshore-wind-boom/ (Dec. 31, 2009,
15:15 GMT).
155. Bhanoo, supra note 154.
156. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
157. Mouawad, supra note 154.
158. See id.
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III. NEITHER TOO HOT NOR TOO COLD, BUT FAR FROM JUST RIGHT: THE
CURRENT REGULATORY CLIMATE FOR OFFSHORE WIND DEVELOPMENT
A. Federal Regulatory Authority
1. The Permitting Process
Although a number of federal laws possibly would be implicated by
offshore wind development,159 three statutes deserve special attention because
they directly inform the permitting process for construction and constructionrelated activities in the Great Lakes: the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1899 (RHA),160 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA),161 and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).162 Congress may have
had different intentions when enacting each of these statutes,163 but today all
three laws are central to the everyday regulatory work of one federal agency,
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps).
With respect to the nation‘s waters, the Corps‘s original directive was to
regulate navigation.164
However, with the advent of the modern
environmental regulatory system in the late 1960s and early ‘70s, Congress
entrusted the Corps with the added responsibility of ―public interest review,‖ a
balanced consideration of a given action‘s favorable and detrimental impacts,

159. These statutes concern environmental quality (Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006), and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–7000 (2006)), fish and wildlife (Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 661–667e (2006), Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1599 (2006), Migratory
Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006), Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668
(2006)), coastal management and historic preservation (Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1451–1466 (2006), and National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006)), national defense
(see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006), regarding United States Coast Guard safety and security zones in
United States waters such as the Great Lakes, where navigation and other activities may be restricted),
and interstate commerce (see, e.g., Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 55102–55111 (2006), which addresses
―coastwise trade‖).
160. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).
161. Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972 § 101–607, 33 U.S.C. § 1251–1387 (2006).
162. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101–102, 42 U.S.C. § 4331–4332 (2006).
163. While the RHA‘s goal is to protect navigation on ―navigable . . . waters of the United
States,‖ the CWA is a water quality and pollution control statute, focused on ―restor[ing] and
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation‘s waters.‖ 33 U.S.C.
§§ 403, 1251. Comparatively speaking, NEPA has a much broader scope, represented by its ―‗twin
aims‘ . . . to place upon [federal] agencies ‗the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the
environmental impact of a proposed [federal] action,‘ and to ‗ensure that the [responsible] agency will
inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking
process.‘‖). Hoosier Envtl. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 105 F. Supp. 2d 953, 966
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97
(1983) (internal citation omitted)).
164. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a) (2009).
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undertaken on the public‘s behalf.165 The Corps weighs these factors before
issuing permits that would allow certain types of activities occurring in waters
under its jurisdiction.166 Within the Corps, thirty-six district engineers and
eleven division engineers administer the regulatory program in accordance
with procedures described in the Corps‘s regulations.167 A district engineer
has the jurisdictional authority to grant or deny permits, although the
engineer‘s decisions are subject to administrative appeal, and eventually,
judicial review.168 In evaluating permit proposals, the Corps strives to avoid
inundating applicants with bureaucratic heavy-handedness,169 thereby
favoring ―general permits, joint processing procedures, interagency review,
coordination, and authority transfers (where authorized by law) to reduce
duplication.‖170
a. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act
Section 10 of the RHA gives the Corps broad authority to authorize the
construction of any structure that may obstruct any ―navigable . . . water[s] of
the United States,‖ including the Great Lakes.171 Because Congress originally
intended the RHA to help alleviate congestion on the country‘s waterways
and thereby enhance interstate commerce,172 section 10 regulates structures
typically seen in rivers, canals, ports, and harbors, including wharfs, piers,
bulkheads, and jetties.173
However, section 10 also gives the Corps
jurisdiction to regulate construction of ―power transmission line[s]‖ and
―permanently moored floating vessel[s],‖174 both of which are necessary for
offshore wind development.175
Notably, while the Code of Federal Regulations prescribes specific

165. Id.
166. Id. § 320.1(b).
167. 33 C.F.R. pts. 325, 330 (2009). The sections of Lakes Michigan and Superior bordering
Wisconsin‘s shores fall within the jurisdiction of the Corps‘s Detroit district office. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Detroit District Organization, http://www.lre.usace.army.mil/who/organization/
(last visited June 27, 2010).
168. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(2); see also 33 C.F.R. pt. 331 (2009).
169. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(3)–(5) (noting that in ―seek[ing] to avoid unnecessary regulatory
controls,‖ the Corps endeavors to make ―timely decision[s]‖ and eliminate ―unnecessary paperwork
and delays‖ whenever possible).
170. Id. § 320.1(a)(5).
171. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).
172. Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 449 F. Supp. 876, 884 (D. Minn. 1978),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 597 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting the ―clear . . .
intent and purpose of [the RHA] was to insure free navigability of interstate commerce through
federal regulation of the subject waterbodies‖).
173. 33 U.S.C. § 403.
174. 33 C.F.R. § 322.2(b) (2009).
175. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 39, 61.
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standards for aerial ―power transmission lines crossing navigable waters,‖176 it
contains only general regulations for all other types of power lines crossing
navigable waters, presumably including the type of submerged power lines
that would transmit electricity from offshore wind turbines and transformers
to land-based collector systems.177 Similarly, the Code very specifically
restricts the anchoring of permanently or temporarily moored floating vessels
associated with oil rigs located in the Gulf of Mexico,178 but it is silent as to
other moored floating vessels, including those used to facilitate offshore wind
turbine construction.179
b. Clean Water Act
While section 10 of the RHA gives the Corps discretion to permit the
excavation from or deposit of material into any U.S. lake,180 the Corps
generally regulates such activity using its authority under section 404 of the
CWA to ―issue permits . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material
into . . . navigable waters.‖181 Unlike the Corps‘s section 10 authority, this
power is subject to veto by the Environmental Protection Agency.182
Before deciding whether to grant a section 404 permit, the Corps conducts
a public interest review and evaluates the proposed activity‘s ―probable
impacts, including cumulative impacts, . . . on the public interest.‖183 The
proposed activity‘s reasonably expected benefits are weighed against its
reasonably foreseeable detriments.184 During this balancing analysis, the
Corps may evaluate as many as twenty-one factors,185 placing varying weight
on each factor as appropriate for the particular proposal.186
176. 33 C.F.R. § 322.5(i)(2).
177. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 61–63.
178. 33 C.F.R. § 322.5(l).
179. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 39–43.
180. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).
181. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006); see also 33 C.F.R. pt. 323 (2009). This statute is commonly
implicated when parties challenge the Corps‘s authority to deny permit applications to dredge or fill
wetlands areas. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
182. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c); see also James City County, Va. v. E.P.A., 12 F.3d 1330, 1336
(4th Cir. 1993); 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (2009).
183. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2009).
184. Id.
185. Id. The possibly relevant factors that must be included in any cumulative impact analysis
are ―conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, historic
properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore
erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety,
food and fiber production, mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the
needs and welfare of the people.‖ Id. That being said, it is not difficult to see why it is essential for
the Corps to seek input from its peer federal agencies, many of which are qualified to provide
specific expertise in these areas. See infra notes 199 and 205 and accompanying text.
186. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1).
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Because Lakes Michigan and Superior are ―waters . . . presently used . . . to
transport interstate . . . commerce shoreward,‖ the Corps has sovereign
jurisdiction over permits for discharges of dredged or fill material within the
lakes.187 The Corps can prohibit virtually any non-agricultural-related discharge
of dredged material,188 other than ―incidental fallback,‖189 that has more than a
de minimis effect on the Great Lakes.190 As for the discharge of fill material,
the Corps can restrict
without limitation, the following activities: Placement of fill
that is necessary for the construction of any structure or
infrastructure in a water of the United States; the building of
any structure, infrastructure, or impoundment requiring rock,
sand, dirt, or other material for its construction; . . . fill for
structures . . . associated with power plants and subaqueous
utility lines.191
Section 404‘s provisions likely would directly impact an offshore wind
project because many of the turbine assemblies currently available on the
market are supported by foundations that rest on lakebeds or seabeds.192 In
fact, the construction of most turbine foundations requires both the
displacement of existing lake or seabed material and the addition of new fill
material.193 Section 404 also would be triggered if the power lines required to
transmit electricity from offshore turbines and substations to onshore collector
systems were buried in the lakebed.194

187. Id. § 323.5 (2009). Section 404(h) of the CWA allows the EPA to transfer to states the
administration of section 404 permits for dredging and discharges in ―waters of the United States,‖
provided the affected waters are not involved in interstate commerce and the states‘ programs pass
muster with federal regulators. Id.
188. See id. § 323.4 (2009).
189. Id. § 323.2(d)(2)(iii) (2009). The Corps once defined ―incidental fallback‖ as the
―redeposit of small volumes of dredged material that is incidental to excavation activities in waters of
the United States when such material falls back to substantially the same place as the initial
removal,‖ for example, when ―dirt is shoveled and the back-spill that comes off a bucket . . . falls
into substantially the same place from which it was removed.‖ 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(ii) (2008).
However, this definition was removed after federal courts ruled that the regulation of incidental
fallback was beyond the Corps‘s jurisdiction. See Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of ―Discharge of Dredged Material‖ and Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 79,641, 79,643–45
(Dec. 30, 2008). Now, whether incidental fallback constitutes discharge of dredged material, thus
giving the Corps regulatory jurisdiction, is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 79,643.
190. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(5).
191. Id. § 323.2(f) (emphasis added).
192. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 25–31.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 63.
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c. National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA‘s ―‗twin aims‘ are to place upon [federal] agencies ‗the obligation
to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed
[federal] action,‘ and to ‗ensure that the [responsible] agency will inform the
public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.‘‖195 Therefore, before the Corps may issue permits under
either section 10 of the RHA or section 404 of the CWA, it must ―take a hard
look at [the] environmental consequences‖ of the proposed activity, a process
that includes ―undertaking [a] public interest review and consideration of
alternatives.‖196
The Corps formally evaluates these factors in an
environmental assessment (EA).197
The first but oftentimes most critical step in the Corps‘s environmental
review process, an EA is a ―concise public document that . . . briefly
provide[s] sufficient evidence and analysis‖ to help the Corps determine
whether it must conduct a more detailed environmental review or simply issue
a Finding of No Significant Impact, or a FONSI.198 Nevertheless, an EA must
be detailed insofar as it incorporates brief discussions of (1) the need for the
proposed activity, (2) any alternatives, (3) the proposed activity‘s
environmental impacts, and (4) a listing of agencies and persons consulted by
the Corps.199
In the Seventh Circuit, the Corps‘s issuance of RHA or CWA permits
normally would require only an EA.200 However, the Code of Federal
Regulations states that this is the case for most, but not necessarily all, permits
issued by the Corps,201 implying that some permitted activities under the
Corps‘s purview mandate a lengthier environmental review process. In fact,
in some jurisdictions the Corps‘s issuance of RHA or CWA permits always
would constitute a ―major federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment‖ because the permit issuance itself is the key factor
determining whether a particular project moves forward.202 Therefore, in such
195. Hoosier Envtl. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 105 F. Supp. 2d 953, 966
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97
(1983) (internal citation omitted)); see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
196. Hoosier Envtl. Council, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (internal quotation omitted); see also
40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.2, 1507.1 (2009).
197. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2009).
198. Id. §§ 1508.9(a), 1508.13; see also infra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
199. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b).
200. 33 C.F.R. § 230.7(a) (2009); see also Hoosier Envtl. Council, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
201. 33 C.F.R. § 230.7(a) (2009).
202. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006);
Hoosier Envtl. Council, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 970. But see Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 875
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that ―federal action within the meaning of the [NEPA] statute includes not
only action undertaken by the agency itself, but also any action permitted or approved by the
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jurisdictions, the agency would have to compose what has become known as
an environmental impact statement (EIS).203 An EIS is a detailed document
that assesses the appropriateness of the proposed federal action prior to its
implementation, focusing on (1) its environmental impact, (2) any
unavoidable adverse environmental effects, (3) alternative plans, (4) the
―relationship between local short-term uses of [the human] environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,‖ and (5) any
irreversible resource commitments.204 As is the case with an EA, when
preparing an EIS a federal agency is expected to consult with and garner the
input of any other federal agencies with concurrent jurisdiction conferred
either ―by law or special expertise.‖205
Because offshore wind projects in Lakes Michigan or Superior likely
would require the Corps to issue either section 10 or section 404 permits, or
both,206 the agency would need to ―take a hard look at [the] environmental
consequences‖ of offshore wind farms in the Great Lakes and prepare an EA,
at the least.207 Nevertheless, if the agency desired to preempt a potential
administrative appeal and, eventually, judicial review initiated by an
interested party and based on NEPA grounds,208 the Corps could expend the
extra time and expense of preparing an EIS before issuing any section 10 or
section 404 permits.209
agency‖), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 644–45 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding that ―[t]he issuance of . . . a
Section . . . 10 permit pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 always constitutes major
federal action and unless the Corps of Engineers . . . makes the negative determination that the
issuance has no significant effect on the environment, an EIS is required. . . . It is irrelevant that the
project may be neither federally financed nor constructed under the auspices of a federal agency.
The key factor is that without federal approval . . . the project could not commence, and thus the
federal action (i.e., issuing the permit) has as much effect on the environment as federal funding
would have.‖) (emphasis added), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v.
Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287 (1981), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 451 U.S. 965 (1981).
203. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2009).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
205. Id.; see also supra notes 170 and 199 and accompanying text.
206. See supra Part III.A.1.a–b.
207. Hoosier Envtl. Council, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (internal quotation omitted); see also
40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.2, 1507.1 (2009).
208. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(2) (2009); see also 33 C.F.R. pt. 331; Hoosier Envtl. Council, 105
F. Supp. 2d at 961–64.
209. This is no insignificant consideration. According to an environmental scientist and leading
NEPA expert who served on a White House task force charged with reinventing the legendary statute,
there are vast differences in the cost and length of EAs and EISs. August Compliance Solutions, Inc.,
Resume
of
Charles
H.
Eccleston,
http://www.acs-saves.com/
CHE%20Resume.htm (last visited June 27, 2010); CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, NEPA AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: TOOLS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPROACHES FOR PRACTITIONERS 6–7
(2008). Reportedly,
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2. Renewable Energy Policy
Citing its desire to both enhance interstate commerce and protect the
environment,210 Congress has seen fit to heavily regulate construction and
construction-related activities in United States waters, including the Great
Lakes.211 In this respect, the states have made the choice to follow the
national government‘s lead, arguably for the betterment of all society.212
That being said, federal lawmakers‘ unwavering commitment to enhance
interstate commerce and protect the environment is certainly commendable.
However, by the same token Congress‘ reticence to advance these goals in the
arena of renewable energies has elicited a range of responses, from
puzzlement213 to exasperation.214 Regrettably, Congress has ―no comprehensive
long term strategy‖ for renewable energies, and ―[a]s a result, federal policy on
wind power must be pieced together from a series of largely disconnected

[s]mall EAs typically are developed by one author, take from 2 weeks to
2 months to complete, vary from 10 to 30 pages in length, and cost between
$5000 and $20,000.
. . . Large EAs typically are developed by an interdisciplinary team, take
from 9 to 18 months to complete, vary from 50 to more than 200 pages in
length, and cost between $50,000 and $200,000.
In contrast, EISs typically are developed by an interdisciplinary team, take
from 1–2 years (sometimes more than 5 years) to complete, vary from 200 to
more than 2000 pages in length, and cost between $250,000 and $2,000,000.
Id.
210. See supra note 163.
211. See supra Part III.A.1.
212. See generally Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First
Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (2004)
(lamenting the CWA‘s historically lackluster enforcement provisions, but praising its ability to
introduce ―impressive improvements in water quality over the past thirty years‖).
213. See Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The
Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 78 (2006).
Hymel noted that
[d]espite rhetoric claiming a commitment to the development and
implementation of alternative and renewable energy and to overcoming our
devastating oil habit, the numbers tell the truth: to date, Americans have only
dabbled in alternatives. . . . [P]olicy makers, hampered by politics, are slow in
formulating a long-range plan for dealing with fossil fuel dependence through
tax policy or elsewhere.
Id.
214. See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong: The Case for a
National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. &
POL‘Y J. 85, 89, 147 (2008) (decrying the ―vacuum of federal leadership on renewable portfolio
standards‖ and noting that ―[g]iven such obvious and overwhelming advantages, it is hard to believe
that many utilities and policymakers diligently oppose a federal RPS mandate, repeating myths that
have long since been debunked‖).
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federal actions.‖215
In the summer of 2010, congressional leaders abandoned the most
promising opportunity in recent history to deliver a comprehensive legislative
solution to the country‘s piecemeal energy strategy. A year after the House of
Representatives passed its version of a broad climate change bill, efforts to
advance similar legislation in the Senate ―collapsed.‖216 Despite early
sustained cooperation from notable members of both political parties, in the
end Democratic Senate leaders conceded that they did not have sufficient
political support to enact a sweeping overhaul of federal energy policy that
had promised to ―reduce greenhouse gas emissions, reduce dependence on
foreign oil and create millions of clean-energy jobs.‖217
Thus, Congress continues to hang its hat on the production tax credit
(PTC), a credit given to renewable energy producers that is currently valued at
approximately 2.1 cents per kWh, adjusted for inflation.218 The PTC has been
credited with spurring much of wind energy‘s development over the past two
decades, and it is still seen as ―an essential step to level the playing field with
conventional [energy] sources.‖219 However, the PTC has experienced
―boom-and-bust cycle[s]‖ as it has faced the constant danger of extinction.220
Most recently, Congress included within the stimulus package a provision
extending the credit until January 1, 2013.221 Nevertheless, this minor
congressional action has not precluded states from carrying the burden in
encouraging expansion of innovative alternative energy industries.
B. Wisconsin Regulatory Authority
1. The Permitting Process
Offshore wind projects in the Great Lakes would have to pass through a
complicated review process, mandated by state laws regulating public utility

215. Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America’s Energy Future: The Future of Renewable
Wind Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 532 (2008).
216. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate Bill in
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15; see also John M. Broder, Graham Pulls Support for
Senate Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2010, at 19.
217. John M. Broder, Graham Calls for ―Pause‖ in Pursuing Energy Bill, N.Y. Times on the
Web (May 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/08/us/politics/08climate.html; Hulse &
Herszenhorn, supra note 216; see also Broder, supra note 216.
218. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
219. Marilyn A. Brown & Sharon (Jess) Chandler, Governing Confusion: How Statutes, Fiscal
Policy, and Regulations Impede Clean Energy Technologies, 19 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 472, 486–87
(2008); Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL‘Y, Spring 2007, at 10, 15–16 (2007).
220. See Brown & Chandler, supra note 219, at 486–87; Rabe, supra note 219, at 15–16.
221. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1101,
123 Stat. 115, 319.
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activities, as well as laws that restrict activities in state waters. Under these
laws, several state agencies have overlapping permit jurisdiction, particularly
the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (PSCW) and the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources (WDNR).222

222. For example, utility facilities, regardless of their location, subject to PSCW approval
under Wisconsin Statutes section 196.49 or section 196.491 also may require WDNR approval under
section 30.025 if their construction includes activities that require a permit, contract, or approval
under Wisconsin Statutes chapter 30. Section 30.025 requires pre-application notification,
establishes a joint PSCW–WDNR application process, ensures WDNR participation in the PSCW
decision making, and requires WDNR to consider the issuance of PSCW approval as a consideration
of practicable alternatives. WDNR is required to issue the necessary chapter 30 permits if it finds
that the proposed facility complies with state and federal environmental standards and that the
proposed facilities do not unduly affect (1) the public‘s rights and interests in navigable waterways,
(2) the effective flood flow of a stream, (3) the rights of other riparian owners, or (4) water quality.
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a. Public Utilities Statutes
In general, the PSCW has primary jurisdiction for reviewing and
approving electricity generation and transmission facilities in Wisconsin,
including wind projects that would be located in the Great Lakes.223 Guided
by a principle of making energy-related decisions that are ―cost-effective,
technically feasible and environmentally sound,‖ the PSCW has two basic
options: to issue either a construction authorization under Wisconsin Statutes
section 196.49(3) or a certificate of public convenience and necessity under
section 196.491(3).224
Under section 196.49(3), the PSCW may issue a construction
authorization if it determines that the proposed project is in the public
interest.225 But the PSCW may refuse to issue a construction authorization if a
project (1) substantially impairs the efficiency of the public utility, (2)
provides facilities unreasonably in excess of probable future requirements, or
(3) adds to the cost of service without proportionately increasing the value or
availability of service.
Smaller electricity generation or transmission projects may require a
construction authorization from the PSCW if they are proposed by a public
utility and the project surpasses the cost thresholds established under
Wisconsin Administrative Code section PSC 112.05(3)(a).226 However, an
entity other than a public utility proposing to build a wind project on the Great
Lakes with a capacity of less than 100 MW would not require PSCW approval
prior to construction.
Large projects, those defined as facilities with a power-generating
223. WIS. STAT. §§ 196.49(3), 196.491(3) (2007–2008). Electric generation and transmission
facilities may be constructed by public utilities that meet any of the definitions outlined in
§ 196.01(5)(a). However, entities other than public utilities also may construct electric-generation
facilities that are defined as wholesale merchant plants in § 196.491(1)(w).
224. Id. §§ 196.025(ar), 196.49(3), 196.491(3); see also id. § 1.12(4) (outlining the state‘s
energy policy and priorities).
225. Id. § 196.49(3)(a).
226. WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC § 112.05(3)(a) (2008) provides that
[c]ost thresholds for projects requiring commission review and approval under
this section are as follows:
1. If the applicant electric utility‘s prior year electric operating revenues
are less than $5,000,000, any project whose estimated gross cost exceeds
$100,000.
2. If the applicant electric utility‘s prior year electric operating revenues
are between $5,000,000 and $250,000,000, any project whose estimated gross
cost exceeds 2 percent of these revenues.
3. If the applicant electric utility‘s prior year electric operating revenues
are more than $250,000,000, any project whose estimated gross cost exceeds
$5,000,000.
Id.
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capacity of 100 MW or greater or transmission lines longer than one mile that
are operated at 100 kilovolts (kV) or higher, generally require a certificate of
public convenience and necessity from the PSCW. Projects that require a
certificate of public convenience and necessity must satisfy a higher standard
of review than projects requiring only a construction authorization.
The PSCW may issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity
only if it determines that the proposed project meets the criteria established in
Wisconsin Statutes section 196.491(3). There are some differences in the
procedures for reviewing wholesale merchant plants,227 but generally the
project must (1) meet the criteria for the issuance of a construction
authorization under section 196.49(3); (2) satisfy the reasonable needs of the
public for an adequate supply of electrical energy, unless it is being proposed
by a wholesale merchant plant; (3) be designed, located, or routed in the
public interest, considering alternative sources of supply, locations, routes,
individual hardships, engineering, safety, economic, and environmental
factors (except that the PSCW cannot consider alternative sources and
economic factors for wholesale merchant plants); (4) not have undue adverse
impacts on the environment, public health and welfare, historic sites,
geological formations, land and water aesthetics, or recreational uses; (5) not
unreasonably interfere with orderly land use and development plans; and (6)
not have a material adverse impact on the wholesale electric service market.228
Because the high cost of developing a wind project on the Great Lakes is
likely to exceed the PSCW‘s threshold for review,229 a project proposed by a
public utility could be expected to require PSCW approval. In contrast,
projects proposed by non-utilities would require PSCW approval only if they
exceeded 100 MW in capacity.
Currently, an offshore wind project in the Great Lakes likely would be
reviewed as two separate projects. The PSCW likely would conduct a thorough
review of the proposed construction of an offshore wind farm,230 and dedicate a
second permit review to concerns surrounding the construction of any related
electric transmission facilities.231 Nevertheless, because of their size and scope
both types of projects likely would require certificates of public convenience
and necessity. Whether conceived as a shallow- or deep-water project,232 a
227. A wholesale merchant plant is an electric generating facility not subject to a leased
generation contract. See WIS. STAT. § 196.491(1)(w) (2007–2008); see also id. § 196.52(9)(a)3.
228. Id. § 196.491(3)(d).
229. See supra note 226.
230. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC §§ 111.51–.53, 112.05(1)(a) (2008).
231. Id. § 112.05(1)(c).
232. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 49–50. The PSCW
Study Group assumed that a 200 MW project, comprised of forty 5 MW turbines spread over eleven
square miles, would be connected to a land-based collector system by one or more 138 kilovolt (kV)
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wind farm is likely a ―[l]arge electric generating facility,‖ and thus subject to
the permit application requirements of Wisconsin Statutes section
196.491(3)(a)(2m).233 The same is likely true for electric transmission facilities
associated with offshore wind farms.234
These requirements can potentially subject applicants to a lengthy and
complicated permit process. First, at least sixty days before submitting an
application to the PSCW, an offshore wind project developer would need to
provide the WDNR with an engineering plan both describing the proposed
facility and showing its location.235 This description would need to list the
proposed wind farm‘s ―major components . . . that have a significant air,
water or solid waste pollution potential, and a brief description of the
anticipated effects . . . on air quality, water quality, . . . and other natural
resources.‖236 Within thirty days of a project developer‘s submission of an
engineering plan, the WDNR must respond with a list of necessary ―permit[s]
or approval[s] which, on the basis of the information contained in the
engineering . . . plan, appear to be required.‖237
Next, an offshore wind project developer would have to file an application
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity with the PSCW at least
six months before the project‘s planned construction start.238 Within thirty
days, the PSCW would inform the developer whether its application is
complete.239 If the PSCW found the application to be incomplete, an
applicant would have an unlimited number of opportunities—and, ostensibly,
an unlimited amount of time—to either supplement or re-file its application.240
submarine cables. Id. at 49. Turbines within the farm itself would be connected by 35 kV submarine
cables. Id. Meanwhile, a deep-water 1,000 MW project, sited about twenty miles offshore in a water
depth of 231 feet and covering approximately fifty-six square miles, would transmit electricity to two
onshore substations via two 345 kV submarine cables. Id. at 50. Its two hundred 5 MW turbines
would be linked by a 35 kV submarine system of cables. Id.
233. WIS. STAT. § 196.491(3)(a)2m.
234. This is likely true because the types of offshore wind farms contemplated for Lakes
Michigan and Superior, as described in supra note 232, require ―high-voltage transmission line[s],‖
as defined by WIS. STAT. § 196.491(1)(f) (including in this definition any ―conductor of electric
energy exceeding one mile in length designed for operation at a nominal voltage of 100 kilovolts or
more, together with associated facilities‖ such as offshore substations and onshore collector systems).
235. Id. § 196.491(3)(a)3.a.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. § 196.491(3)(a)1.
239. Id.; see also Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm‘n, 2005 WI 93, ¶¶ 59–60, 282
Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 (holding that an application for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity is ―complete‖ if it includes all the information required by WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC
§ 111.53(1) (2008)). Nevertheless, an application for a large electric generating facility may pass
muster under a standard of substantial completeness, even if it has yet to receive the requisite nonPSCW permits or approvals. See WIS. STAT. § 196.491(3)(a)2m.
240. WIS. STAT. § 196.491(3)(a)2.
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Finally, within 180 days of a determination of the application‘s
completeness, the PSCW must take final action on the application for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity, although the PSCW may
petition the court for an extension of up to an additional 180 days ―[u]pon a
showing of good cause.‖241 All things considered, the PSCW could issue a
certificate of public convenience and necessity to an offshore wind farm no
sooner than eight months after an applicant filed its first papers with the
WDNR. In a worst-case scenario, the permitting process could take years, all
depending on whether the PSCW deemed a project developer‘s application to
be complete.242
b. The Public Trust Doctrine
Aside from cost, the most significant challenges an offshore wind farm
developer likely can expect are public concerns regarding the project‘s
environmental impacts and aesthetic effects on shoreline views. The state
protects these interests through its public trust doctrine.
This long-held doctrine preserves public use rights in the state‘s navigable
waters, including Lakes Michigan and Superior, and is embodied by
Article IX, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The public trust doctrine
protects not only ―the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into
the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the
same,‖243 it also holds the beds of the state‘s navigable waters in public
trust.244
The concept behind the public trust doctrine is that ―‗some resources are
subject to a perpetual trust that forecloses private exclusion rights.‘‖245
Serving as trustee, the state holds title to its navigable waters, including the
beds of Lakes Michigan and Superior up to the ordinary high-water mark.246
241. Id. § 196.491(3)(g).
242. See supra note 239.
243. WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1. According to one commentator, this provision has not been
amended since Wisconsin‘s admission to statehood in 1848.
See Jason J. Czarnezki,
Environmentalism and the Wisconsin Constitution, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 465, 468 (2007).
244. Czarnezki, supra note 243.
245. Id. (quoting Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American
Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800
(2004)).
246. An ordinary high-water mark is a ―jurisdictional benchmark‖ that guides the Corps in the
administration of its RHA section 10 and CWA section 404 regulatory programs. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers–Detroit District, Ordinary High Water Mark and Low Water Datum,
http://www.lre.usace.army.mil/_kd/go.cfm?destination=Page&pge_id=1879&dialog=0 (last visited
June 27, 2010). This ―line on the shore coincide[s] with the elevation contour that represents the
approximate location of the line on the shore established by fluctuations of water and indicated by
physical characteristics such as shelving, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, presence of litter or
debris, or changes in the character of soil.‖ Id. Lake Michigan‘s ordinary high-water mark is
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The state supreme court has held that these waters ―should be free to all for
commerce, for travel, [and] for recreation,‖247 and the Wisconsin Legislature
has delegated enforcement authority of this trust to the WDNR.248
Nevertheless, ―the legislature may authorize limited encroachments upon
the beds of such waters where the public interest will be served.‖249 To that
end, chapter 30 of the Wisconsin Statutes gives the WDNR the discretion to
permit the placement of building structures on the beds of navigable
waterways.250 In keeping with its mandate to protect the public trust, the
WDNR may issue building structure permits only after having weighed
relevant policy factors, including ―the desire to preserve the natural beauty of
our navigable waters, to obtain the fullest public use of such waters, including
but not limited to navigation, and to provide for the convenience of riparian
owners.‖251
Under a separate provision of the Wisconsin Statutes, the legislature has
the authority to issue lakebed grants.252 Even though the legislature alone has
the authority to approve a lakebed grant, the WDNR plays a critical role in
lawmakers‘ decision making. The WDNR must prepare a detailed report
assessing the impacts of such a conveyance, including the lakebed area‘s
location and description, the proposed conveyance‘s purposes, expected use
of the lakebed area within the proposed conveyance, the effect of the
proposed conveyance on public trust uses, potential subsequent conveyances,
if any, and the ability of the grantee to manage the use of the lakebed area.253
Finally, the WDNR must conclude its report with a determination whether
legislation conveying a lakebed area is ―consistent with protecting and
enhancing a public trust purpose,‖ including a consideration of whether ―any
commercial uses of the lakebed area subject to the proposed conveyance are

581.5 feet above sea level, while the corresponding mark in Lake Superior is at an elevation of
603.1 feet. Id. The Corps has jurisdiction over lakebed areas below these marks, but Wisconsin has
authority over areas above these lines. Id.
247. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914).
248. Hilton v. Dep‘t of Natural Res., 2006 WI 84, ¶¶ 19–20, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166
(internal citation omitted).
249. Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n, 32 Wis. 2d 608, 618, 146 N.W.2d 577, 582 (1966) (internal
citation omitted).
250. See WIS. STAT. § 30.12 (2007–2008) (outlining permit requirements for ―[s]tructures and
deposits in navigable waters‖); id. § 30.21 (permitting ―[u]se of beds of Great Lakes by public
utilities‖).
251. Sterlingworth Condo. Ass‘n v. Dep‘t of Natural Res., 205 Wis. 2d 710, 724–25, 556
N.W.2d 791, 796 (Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Hixon, 32 Wis. 2d at 620, 556 N.W.2d
791).
252. See WIS. STAT. § 13.097 (2007–2008).
253. Id. § 13.097(4).
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minor and incidental‖ when compared to the public‘s ability to continue
accessing the area.254
Finally, in conjunction with the Board of Commissioners of Public Lands
(BCPL),255 the WDNR may approve leases of public lands beneath Lakes
Michigan and Superior,256 as long as any proposed physical change in the area
that may result from the lease is ―consistent with the public interest in the
navigable waters involved.‖257 Lease terms shall not exceed fifty years and
must include ―any and all conditions‖ the BCPL deem necessary to protect the
public interest.258
Because of the novelty of offshore wind farms, if the state legislature and
administrative agencies were to issue a project applicant‘s request for a
building structure permit, they likely would do so under Wisconsin Statutes
section 30.12 or agree to a medium-term lease of a lakebed area to the
developer, as allowed in section 24.39. Unlike lakebed grants, which are
essentially permanent conveyances, building structure permits and lakebed
leases are temporary and more likely to pass muster with a body politic that is
curious, but not yet entirely sure, about offshore wind energy‘s potential.
State officials desiring to obtain the fullest public use of the state‘s navigable
waters can balance the need to enforce the public trust doctrine—and thus
protect traditional uses of commerce, travel, and recreation—with increasing
demands to find creative ways to deliver to their constituents electricity
derived from renewable energy sources.259
c. The Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act
Much like NEPA,260 the Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act (WEPA)
mandates that state agencies evaluate the ―environmental, socioeconomic,
energy, archeological, agricultural, and other effects of a proposed project
before issuing permits or other approvals.‖261 Using language that echoes
NEPA, the Wisconsin Legislature has outlined a policy under which all state
agencies, including the PSCW, must prepare a ―detailed statement‖ before
engaging in any ―major actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.‖262

254. Id. § 13.097(6).
255. Id. § 24.39(2).
256. Id. § 24.39(4)(c)–(d).
257. Id. § 24.39(4)(c).
258. Id. § 24.39(4)(e).
259. See supra notes 245–49 and accompanying text.
260. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.c.
261. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 110; see also
WIS. STAT. § 1.11 (2007–2008).
262. WIS. STAT. § 1.11.
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For utility projects such as offshore wind farms, the PSCW has
established guidelines to help it determine whether the project would require a
full environmental impact statement (EIS) or a less rigorous environmental
assessment (EA).263 Nevertheless, the PSCW has the discretion to prepare an
EIS for any project that it believes is controversial or that could significantly
affect the environment.264
Oftentimes, WEPA also compels ―[i]nteragency cooperation‖265 between
the PSCW and the WDNR. A statutory provision requires the two agencies to
coordinate on many projects266 and allows them to prepare a joint EIS for
major electric generation or transmission projects.267 Any offshore wind farm
developed in Lakes Michigan or Superior likely would be the result of such
collaboration.
2. Renewable Energy Policy
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, among the states Wisconsin
showed early promise of placing itself on the vanguard of renewable energy
policy. However, over the past decade, the Wisconsin Legislature has
declined to take any real significant steps toward developing a long-term
renewable energy strategy.
In 1999, Wisconsin created a Renewable Resource Credit Program that
allows utilities to buy and sell renewable resource credits (or, renewable
energy credits, as they are known in other states) for any electricity generated
in excess of the percentage specified for a given year.268 Credits also may be
rolled over for use in up to four subsequent years.269 The movement of these
credits is tracked on the Midwest Renewable Energy Tracking System.270
Also in 1999, Wisconsin became the first state to enact a renewable
portfolio standard without restructuring its electric utility industry.271
However, the legislature‘s first attempt at compelling state utilities to invest in
renewable energy sources was relatively modest: Wisconsin required them to
obtain only 2.2% of their electricity sold to customers from renewable energy

263. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC §§ 4.10–4.30 (2008).
264. Id. § 4.40.
265. Id. § 4.60.
266. See WIS. STAT. § 196.025(2m) (2007–2008).
267. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC § 4.60 (2008).
268. See WIS. STAT. § 196.378(3) (2007–2008).
269. Id.
270. DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Wisconsin
Incentives/Policies for Renewables and Efficiency: Renewable Portfolio Standard,
http://dsireusa.org/library/includes/incentive2.cfm?Incentive_Code=WI05R&state=WI&
CurrentPageID=1&RE=1&EE=1 (last visited June 27, 2010) [hereinafter DSIRE: Wisconsin].
271. DSIRE: Wisconsin, supra note 270.
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resources by 2012.272 In 2006, the legislature raised this requirement to 10%
by 2015, but this RPS still lags behind those of other states, many of which
require 20% of their energy to come from renewable sources by 2020 or
sooner.273
Recently, the ambitious Clean Energy Jobs Act had promised to help
Wisconsin catch up to its peer states. Introduced in the Wisconsin Legislature
in January 2010274 and based on recommendations made by Governor Jim
Doyle‘s Task Force on Global Warming in 2008,275 the Act proposed to move
up the date (from 2015 to 2013) by which state electric utilities would be
required to meet the 10% RPS, and it would have increased Wisconsin‘s RPS
to 20% by 2020 and to 25% by 2025.276 Notably, the Act also would have
required state electric utilities to derive at least 30% of their renewable energy
from in-state facilities, thus encouraging development of more renewable
energy projects in the state of Wisconsin and discouraging reliance on
renewable energy generated elsewhere, such as at wind farms in Minnesota,
the Dakotas, and Iowa.277 This largely would be accomplished by a feed-in
tariff program through which electric utilities would pay renewable energy
producers located within their service areas a fixed price per unit of electricity
produced (the feed-in tariffs).278 According to a comprehensive economic
impact analysis conducted by the state government, such changes were
projected to help jumpstart Wisconsin‘s green economy and directly create at
least 15,000 green jobs in Wisconsin by 2025, including more than 1,800 jobs
in the first year after enactment.279 In addition, the Act was projected to create
between 800 and 1,800 well-paying construction jobs each year from 2011 to
2025, and more than 2,000 high-wage manufacturing jobs after the new laws

272. Id.
273. DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Renewables Portfolio
Standards
for
Renewable
Energy,
http://dsireusa.org/library/includes/
seeallincentivetype.cfm?type=RPS&currentpageid=7&back=regtab&EE=1&RE=1 (last visited June 27,
2010).
274. S. 450, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2010).
275. See generally GOVERNOR‘S TASK FORCE ON GLOBAL WARMING, WISCONSIN‘S
STRATEGY
FOR
REDUCING
GLOBAL
WARMING
(2008),
http://dnr.wi.gov/
environmentprotect/gtfgw/documents/Final_Report.pdf. For more information about the history of
the Governor‘s Task Force on Global Warming, see Jim Doyle, Challenges and Opportunities for
Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions at the State, Regional, and Local Level, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL‘Y 213 (2009).
276. See Wis. S. 450 §§ 178–186.
277. Id. §§ 170, 183.
278. Id. § 208.
279. Memorandum on Economic Assessment of Clean Energy Jobs Act from Econ. and Policy
Staff
to
Energy
Independence
Cabinet
Team
6–8
(Jan.
5,
2010),
http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=18757.
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were fully implemented.280
However, the Clean Energy Jobs Act died in the state senate as legislators
failed to act on the bill before the session‘s close of business for the year.281
The bill‘s future, and the likelihood of its eventual passage, is unclear, with
significant changeover expected at the state capitol after the election of a new
governor and legislature in the fall of 2010.282
IV. TINKERING WITH WISCONSIN‘S NOVEL EXPERIMENT: CREATING
OPPORTUNITIES TO TEST OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY
There is much to be said for the fact that Wisconsin policy makers have
shown the curiosity to investigate the merits of offshore wind energy. Few
other states can claim to be so bold. However, Wisconsin can, and should,
take additional steps to increase the number of opportunities to produce
offshore wind energy in Lakes Michigan and Superior.
A. Smoother Sailing: Streamlining the Permitting Process for
Offshore Wind Projects
To the extent that the Wisconsin Legislature has equipped the PSCW with
tools for ―interagency cooperation‖ to help utilities and state agencies satisfy
WEPA requirements,283 the legislature could further streamline the permitting
process for offshore wind farm developers by creating an offshore wind
coordinator who would operate independently of both the PSCW and the
WDNR.
This individual would serve as the point person for all offshore wind
project applications. Depending on the existing workload of the state‘s
WEPA coordinator,284 the legislature could save money and add such duties to
the WEPA coordinator‘s job description. However, given the multiple
permits involved with offshore wind farms and the industry‘s potential for
growth,285 it likely would be wiser for the legislature to make offshore wind
280. Id. at 1, 8.
281. Patrick Marley, Deal Reached on Payday Loans: But Energy, Transit, Voting Bills Die in
Senate, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 23, 2010, at 1A (noting that the state senate declined to forward
the Clean Energy Jobs Act to the state assembly on the fortieth anniversary of Earth Day, which was
founded by the late U.S. Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin).
282. Id.
283. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC § 4.60 (2008) (ordering the PSCW to ―consult with federal
and state agencies early when preparing an EA or EIS‖ and allowing the agency to ―enter into
agreements with other federal or state agencies to develop a joint EIS‖); id. § 4.80 (outlining the
powers and duties of the state‘s WEPA coordinator, whose main tasks are to ―oversee performance
of environmental impact statement procedures‖ and to serve as the PSCW‘s liaison to permit
applicants with questions regarding WEPA requirements); see also WIS. STAT. § 196.025(2m)(b)
(2007–2008) (requiring the PSCW and the DNR to ―coordinate the execution of their respective
duties under [WEPA] for any action‖ of either agency regarding a project, as necessary).
284. See supra note 283.
285. HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 8.
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applications the sole responsibility of one person.
At a fundamental level, this offshore wind coordinator would have duties
similar to those carried out by the state‘s WEPA coordinator, in the sense that
she would ―[a]ct as contact for other state agencies seeking assistance‖ on
offshore wind farm issues, in addition to serving as the state‘s public liaison
for offshore wind project applications.286 However, similar to the United
Kingdom‘s Infrastructure Planning Commission,287 the offshore wind
coordinator should have full power to issue permits to offshore wind
projects,288 and most importantly, should serve independently of both the
PSCW and the WDNR. This detachment would allow the coordinator to
make permit decisions free of the influence and pressure inherent in
interagency politics.
By the same token, the legislature should preempt potential allegations
that the offshore wind coordinator would be vested with too much power
under a so-called undemocratic permitting process, reminiscent of the
criticism that doomed the U.K.‘s Infrastructure Planning Commission.289 To
that end, state lawmakers could consciously limit the size of the bureaucracy,
inserting provisions in legislation creating the offshore wind coordinator to
allow the position to be expanded to a small commission or council only if the
number and complexity of incoming permit applications reached a certain
threshold.290
The PSCW and WDNR could further properly restrain the offshore wind
coordinator‘s independence by drafting clear statewide policy statements
regarding what types of offshore wind projects may be permitted. In concert
with existing authorities such as WEPA, these binding policy statements
would serve as strategic blueprints to guide the coordinator‘s permitting
decisions.291 Moreover, similar to the national policy statements created
under the U.K.‘s Planning Act, these policy statements could be tailor-made
286. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC § 4.80(1)(a) (2008). As discussed earlier, offshore wind
projects likely would require full environmental impact statements. See supra Part III.B.1.
However, to expedite the process an offshore wind coordinator could conduct a generic joint EIS that
would incorporate standards set forth by both the WDNR and the PSCW. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE
PSC § 4.40; HARNESSING WISCONSIN‘S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 14, at 138. The offshore
wind coordinator could begin at least the preliminary steps of this evaluation process in advance of
receiving an applicant‘s completed project proposal.
287. See supra Part II.A.2.
288. In situations in which Wisconsin shares jurisdiction with federal agencies, to the extent
that federal permits are necessary, see supra Part III.A.1, the offshore wind coordinator also should
be allowed to enter into agreements with the corresponding federal agencies to issue joint permits.
289. See supra Part II.A.2.
290. Alternatively, if lawmakers prefer to give the position a trial period of, say, five to seven
years, they could write into the legislation a sunset clause, which could be helpful if the person who
serves as the inaugural offshore wind coordinator turns in a disappointing performance.
291. See supra Part II.A.2.
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for each project proposal, open to both public comment and debate and
approval by the legislature.292 The offshore wind coordinator should be
allowed to grant or deny a permit to a project only after having provided
members of the public and state legislature several genuine opportunities for
consultation and scrutiny and after assessing the technical merits of each
project application.293 As with any other state administrative agency, the
offshore wind coordinator‘s decisions should be subject to judicial review.
B. The Air Over There: European Lessons in Facilitating Cooperative
Federal–State Renewable Energy Policy Making
Much of the literature debating the appropriateness of a national RPS is
either decidedly for or against such a standard.294 Yet, instead of excoriating
one position or the other, commentators—and, in turn, policy makers—should
focus on the many ways in which federal and state governments can
collaborate to advance their respective renewable energy goals.295 Viewed
from another perspective, such partnerships are essential. For example, while
the federal government has the authority to regulate interstate energy
transmission, only state and local governments can oversee construction of
electricity generation and transmission facilities.296 Therefore, taking cues
from the European Union (EU) and EU member nations that have endeavored
to bring their energy programs into the twenty-first century,297 the federal and
Wisconsin state governments should cooperate to promote renewable energy
policies, with each governmental entity taking on a complementary yet critical
role.
1. The Federal Government
Both the federal and Wisconsin state governments seek to encourage the
development of renewable energy industries. However, a number of factors
dictate against a national RPS,298 most notably the fact that Wisconsin, like
more than two-dozen other states,299 already has such a standard in place.300
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. Compare Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 214, at 146–47 (arguing that a ―national RPS
would decrease consumer electricity prices, . . . benefit utility profits, . . . help American companies by
creating more new jobs for American workers[, . . . and] provide secondary environmental and social
benefits‖), with Michaels, supra note 7, at 110–12 (citing ―jurisdictional conflicts . . . between state and
federal regulators,‖ concluding that a ―national RPS is an inefficient and inequitable response to
emissions of pollutants and [greenhouse gases]‖).
295. See Rosenberg, supra note 215, at 542–43.
296. See id. at 535 (referring to the congressionally authorized scope of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)); see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC §§ 111–112 (2008).
297. See supra Part II.A.1.
298. See Michaels, supra note 7, at 110–12.
299. See supra note 6.
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Rather, through Congress the federal government can best support renewable
energy sources by (1) expanding its arsenal of financial incentives to help
capitalize these upstart industries, particularly capital-intensive offshore wind
energy, and (2) investing in and clearing regulatory hurdles to improving an
outdated national electric grid.
This two-pronged approach can help eliminate what are currently the most
significant barriers to offshore wind development—the need for substantial
capital to finance high-cost construction projects and a lack of integration into
the national electric grid.301 Moreover, by implementing this strategy the
federal government could send a clear signal to renewable energy investors,
producers, and consumers regarding the nation‘s policy shift to a twenty-firstcentury energy agenda.
On the one hand, the federal government can provide market stability—
and, thus, alleviate much of the risk faced by offshore wind energy investors
and project developers—by adding some longevity to tax incentives such as
the PTC302 and embracing other market support schemes already employed by
EU countries, including investment grants and low-interest loan guarantees.303
On the other hand, by helping expand the offshore wind industry and thus
increasing the number of opportunities consumers have to purchase their
electricity from renewable energy sources, the federal government could do
300. See WIS. STAT. § 196.378 (2007–2008).
301. See Brown & Chandler, supra note 219, at 486, 491–92; Sanya Carleyolsen, Tangled in
the Wires: An Assessment of the Existing U.S. Renewable Energy Legal Framework, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 759, 764–65, 790 (2006) (noting that ―many [renewable energy] policy experts stress
the need for a new law that both guarantees access to the grid and has a built-in mechanism to make
renewable power cost-competitive with oil and natural gas‖).
302. With its recent passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
Congress again gave the PTC for wind power a short extension, this time until January 1, 2013. See
supra note 221 and accompanying text. However, as several commentators have argued, to provide
any semblance of market stability, Congress needs to make the tax credit more, if not ultimately,
permanent. See Rosenberg, supra note 215, at 542; Brown & Chandler, supra note 219, at 486;
Rabe, supra note 219, at 15–16; Richard A. Westin, Energy and Environmental Tax Changes in the
Flood of Recent Federal Revenue Laws and What They Imply, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 171, 276,
294 (2007). Such a move would not be all that extraordinary. Recently, President Obama proposed
to make permanent a popular business research and development tax credit, albeit for somewhat
different reasons: ―to spur the slumping economy‖ and encourage small businesses to create highwage jobs for middle-class Americans. Jackie Calmes, Obama to Pitch Permanent Research Tax
Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2010, at A22.
303. See Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 38, at 21–23. The author concedes
that EU policy makers have found the effectiveness of investment grants difficult to measure because
generally EU member countries have used them as additional policy tools, in concert with other
mechanisms such as feed-in tariff or renewable green certificate programs. See Commission Staff
Working Document, supra note 38, at 9. Nevertheless, because the startup costs of offshore wind
farms are significantly higher than those related to land-based projects, matching grants and lowinterest loans could allow the federal government to assume some of the upfront risk and may help
entice private investment in such enterprises.
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its part in satisfying Americans‘ desire to wean themselves off fossil fuels.304
However, to deliver renewable energy to the consumer marketplace, the
federal government needs to invest in transforming the existing electricity
transmission infrastructure into a ―smart grid‖ so that it may incorporate
power from renewable sources like solar panels and wind turbines.305 A smart
grid should be equipped not only to accommodate the intermittent-generation
nature of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind,306 but also to be
more cost- and energy-efficient in electricity delivery from generation point to
consumer.307
Finally, Congress needs to counter the negative effects of more than a
decade of rapid deregulation with prudent regulatory controls that support
localized electricity generation and market transparency. 308 The most serious
problems facing the existing national grid are the lack of system reliability
and increasing externality costs, both of which largely are due to uninhibited
consumer demand.309 Federal regulations that aim to reduce these strains on
the national grid could have the effect of improving consumer access to
renewable energy sources such as offshore wind.310
In the lead-up to announcing its 20 20 by 2020 plan, the European

304. Not only are renewable energy sources such as wind and solar supported by roughly nine
out of ten Americans, reportedly three-quarters of the American public is willing to pay more to
consume electricity produced by these sources, if doing so would help reduce global warming. See
Americans‘ Views, supra note 4. Incidentally, 64% of the public also is ―willing to pay higher taxes
on gasoline and other fuels if the money [is] used for research into renewable sources like solar and
wind energy.‖ Id.
305. Matthew L. Wald, Hurdles (Not Financial Ones) Await Electric Grid Update, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at A11; see also supra note 301.
306. See Wald, supra note 305.
307. For an insightful proposal of distributed generation as a flexible means by which to
introduce these benefits to the electricity marketplace, see Kristin Bluvas, Comment, Distributed
Generation: A Step Forward in United States Energy Policy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1589, 1601–05 (2007).
Of course, there still may be the power-line power struggles inherent to shared federal and state
regulation of the electric grid. Some ideas to resolve these anticipated disputes include federal
assumption of sole responsibility for approving electric transmission lines, as was the case in the
1930s with natural gas pipelines, and creation of a ―national commission that would present a master
plan for thousands of miles of new transmission lines that Congress could approve for the whole
country in spite of local objections for individual pieces.‖ Wald, supra note 305.
308. See Bluvas, supra note 307, at 1597–1601. One commentator lays the blame squarely at
the feet of the FERC, which in 1996 promulgated FERC Order 888, ―open[ing] the once regulated
electricity market to competition‖ by requiring ―all utilities to allow their transmission lines to be
used by competitors.‖ Id. at 1593. This deregulation had the short-term effect of introducing price
competition to the marketplace and thus benefiting consumers. Id. However, in the long run
deregulation resulted in ―unanticipated consequences for the electricity system,‖ including a spike in
public utility mergers, which helped ―foster[] an environment where larger centralized generation
could grow.‖ Id. at 1594.
309. Id. at 1597–1601.
310. Id. at 1605.
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Commission identified similar access issues as a key barrier to the continued
development of that continent‘s renewable energy sources.311 But until the
EU community addressed this and other long-standing barriers to offshore
wind development, industry expansion stalled.312
Without bold congressional action, the same result may be expected here.
Admittedly, there is no denying the enormity of such challenges. However,
federal lawmakers could take comfort in knowing that other nations have
confronted these very same dilemmas, and have emerged even more
committed and optimistic about the prospects of offshore wind energy. 313
Besides, for all practical purposes, only Congress—perhaps, with a little help
from the Departments of Treasury, Energy, and Interior—has the political and
fiscal wherewithal to effectively address such colossal tasks.
2. The Wisconsin State Government
Nevertheless, there is much Wisconsin can do on its own to advance the
development of offshore wind energy and other renewable sources. In
addition to enacting the Clean Energy Jobs Act, the state legislature can
enhance the Act‘s proposed feed-in tariff program with a premium provision
that would give individual renewable energy producers an incentive to
produce additional electricity to earn competitively awarded premiums, or
bonuses.314 By guaranteeing participating producers a tariff subsidy for a
long-term period of ten to twenty years, the state could reassure nervous
industry investors at least until Wisconsin‘s renewable electricity market
becomes relatively self-sufficient and therefore encourage development of
offshore wind farms in Lakes Michigan and Superior.
However, such incentives likely would not be of much benefit to
renewable energy producers unless they were able to rely on a modern and
efficient electric grid. To that end, Wisconsin would be even better served if
it followed the example of Portugal,315 one EU member nation that since 2000
311. Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 38, at 16; see also 2009 Renewable
Energy Directive, supra note 17, at 31.
312. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
314. See S. 450, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 208 (Wis. 2010); see also supra notes 38 & 278
and accompanying text.
315. The comparison with Portugal is worthwhile. Even though Portugal is nearly twice as
populous as Wisconsin (10.6 million residents to 5.6 million), its status as one of more than twodozen EU member nations is similar to Wisconsin‘s status as one of the fifty states. U.S. Department
of State, Background Note: Portugal, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3208.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2010);
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
State
&
County
QuickFacts:
Wisconsin,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2010). Moreover, Portugal‘s
and Wisconsin‘s economies are nearly the same size—Portugal has a gross domestic product of $220
billion, while Wisconsin‘s gross state domestic product is $240 billion—and both feature a mixed
base of manufacturing, agriculture, and service industries. U.S. Department of State, Background
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has taken bold steps to revolutionize its energy program. In only a decade,
Portugal has established itself as a model for other EU nations seeking to
transition from reliance on traditional to renewable energy sources.316 By
purchasing at fair market value prices all of the country‘s electric transmission
lines, the Portuguese government created the basis of a single regulated and
publicly traded company that now operates all of Portugal‘s electric lines.317
With this critical step, the Portuguese government ―separat[ed] making
electricity from transporting it,‖ thus loosening electric utilities‘ hold on the
market and opening the door for competition from new producers of
renewable energy, which traditionally had been discouraged by utilities that
invested heavily in fossil fuels.318 In addition, the national grid was improved
and modernized to accommodate electricity intermittently produced by
renewable sources such as wind and solar power, thus assuring producers that
they could readily and reliably transport the necessary amount of electricity to
their consumers.319 By investing $637 million in modernizing its national
electric grid,320 Portugal has transitioned to a renewable energy program that
the International Energy Agency has heralded as a ―remarkable success.‖321
Wisconsin also could achieve remarkable progress in its renewable energy
efforts if it made significant investments in upgrading the state‘s electric grid,
an endeavor that already is being investigated by some of the leading
transmission line operators in the state and region.322 In addition to
modernizing the grid to better accommodate distribution of wind power

Note: Portugal, supra; Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product by State Interactive
Map,
http://www.bea.gov/
regional/gdpmap/GDPMap.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
316. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Portugal Gives Itself a Clean-Energy Makeover, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2010, at A1; see also REN, Key Milestones, http://www.ren.pt/vEN/
RENGroup/KeyMilestones/Pages/grupo-ren_key-milestones.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
317. Rosenthal, supra note 316.
318. Id.
319. Id. (noting that Portugal‘s national energy transmission company, REN, ―uses
sophisticated modeling to predict weather, especially wind patterns, and computer programs to
calculate energy from the various renewable-energy plants,‖ but to ―ensure a stable power base‖ it
also ―maintain[s] a base of fossil fuel that can be fired up at will‖).
320. Id. Portuguese government officials estimate that the total effort to revamp the country‘s
energy structure will cost about $22 billion, or about $2.3 billion a year less to operate than in past
years. Id. Notably, Portugal‘s energy restructure did not create any new taxes or public debt, in part
because the new electricity sources (wind and solar) ―replaced electricity previously produced by
buying and burning imported natural gas, coal and oil.‖ Id. Restructuring costs were either absorbed
by the private companies operating Portugal‘s grid and renewable energy plants or filtered through
electricity rates paid by consumers. Id.
321. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
322. Thomas Content, Study Will Consider New High-Voltage Lines for Renewable Power,
Milwaukee J. Sentinel on the Web (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/business/
53623657.html.
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generated in Lakes Michigan and Superior, the state government could loosen
large utilities‘ hold on the market and pave the way for competition from
upstart renewable energy producers.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how much willpower the state of
Wisconsin has for an energy makeover. A substantial overhaul of
Wisconsin‘s electric grid would require state policy makers to tap a
considerable amount of both political and financial capital that currently is in
short supply and, in all likelihood, will be so for at least several more years.
The potential political shift in the fall 2010 elections and a slow economic
recovery from the 2008–09 recession dull the prospects here of a large-scale
energy program restructure such as that undertaken in Portugal over the past
decade. That country‘s transition was enabled by ―huge government support
and intervention,‖ concepts that on this side of the Atlantic are subject to an
increasing measure of public skepticism.323 Moreover, like residents of many
other European countries, Portuguese households are accustomed to paying
higher electricity prices—―about twice what Americans pay‖—and thus they
have not balked at a 15% rise in prices over the past five years, an increase
likely attributable in part to the country‘s renewable energy transition.324 In
Wisconsin, as in much of the United States, so long as consumers can readily
purchase cheap electricity—electricity generated from fossil fuels, which
remain in large supply here—it is unlikely that there will be much public
pressure for a renewable energy transition.
V. WISCONSIN‘S NEED FOR A MORE NOVEL EXPERIMENT: A CALL TO ENACT
COMPREHENSIVE OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY LEGISLATION
On the other hand, recent man-made environmental disasters—most
notably, history‘s largest marine oil spill in the summer of 2010—have
―renewed questions about the risks and unpredictable costs of America‘s
unremitting dependence on fossil fuels.‖325 In fact, whether Americans truly
are ready to divorce themselves from oil and coal remains the single-most
important question in the debate over the need for renewable energies such as
wind power.
Although the public seems to overwhelmingly support such change,326 the
expansion of wind power in this country has been hampered because of a

323. Rosenthal, supra note 316.
324. Id.
325. Id.; see supra note 130.
326. 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030, supra note 90, at 116. Citing a 2005 poll conducted by Yale
University, the U.S. Department of Energy contends that 87% of the population supports the
expansion of wind energy development. Nevertheless, the agency also concedes that NIMBY
opposition to wind farms ―can strengthen when particular [project] sites are proposed.‖ Id.

2010]

OFFSHORE WIND PROJECTS

1581

―complex interplay of factors,‖ including practical,327 environmental,328 and
intangible considerations.329 These factors notwithstanding, together they
have not inhibited the expansion of wind power development as significantly
as has federal lawmakers‘ general reticence to embrace sustainable energy
alternatives to fossil fuels.330 Such reticence is difficult to justify, especially
considering the national fatigue with unpredictable fossil fuel prices.331
Federal legislators have yet to develop a national standard reflecting the
country‘s twenty-first-century energy needs.332
Congress would be wise to enact such legislation in the near future, and
not solely for energy-related reasons. As of this writing, the American
economy continued to languish as recent government efforts to stimulate job
creation have failed to do much else than ―‗stop[] the bleeding.‘‖333 A
significant investment, both politically and financially, in sustainable or
―green‖ industries could provide the American economy the jumpstart it so
badly needs, and could lay the foundation for the country‘s long-term energy
solution.334 The future is promising: Already, the United States leads the
world in wind-energy-generating capacity.335 Still, this country is likely years
away from implementing the type of regulatory framework now in place in
Europe.336
Although they should seek out opportunities for collaboration,337
Wisconsin lawmakers should not wait for Congress to act. Rather, it is time
for the state legislature to address Wisconsin‘s pressing energy concerns and
lay the foundation for long-term economic security by enacting

327. See supra notes 141–53 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 131–39 & 154–58 and accompanying text.
329. See generally Cotter, supra note 6, at 415–28 (internal quotations omitted).
330. See supra Part III.A.2.
331. According to two commentators, ―[b]etween 1995 and 2005, natural gas prices rose by an
average of 15% per year, and the electricity sector‘s demand for natural gas increased from 24% of
total natural gas consumption in 2000 to 29% in 2005.‖ Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 214, at 100.
Extreme examples were seen in Illinois, where in fall 2006 ratepayers protested projected one-year
utility rate increases ranging from 22% to 55%, and in Boston, Massachusetts, where homeowners
and small businesses‘ electricity bills rose by 78% from 2002 to 2006. Id. at 101. Meanwhile, ―[i]n
some areas of the United States, coal prices actually doubled between 2002 and 2004.‖ Id. at 102;
see also supra notes 4 and 294.
332. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
333. Calmes, supra note 302 (quoting President Barack Obama).
334. As President Obama sees it, ―‗Renewable energy isn‘t some[] pie in the sky. It‘s not part
of a far-off future. It‘s happening all across America right now . . . . It can create millions of
additional jobs and entire new industries if we act right now.‘‖ Obama Wants Green Economy,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 17, 2009, at 3A.
335. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
336. See discussion supra Part IV.
337. See supra Part IV.B.

1582

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:1533

comprehensive legislation that will foster the well-ordered development of an
offshore wind energy industry in the state‘s very own Great Lakes waters.
Wisconsin‘s novel experiment need not necessarily be entirely original.338
Some of the most promising tools already have been debuted in progressive
nations across the Atlantic Ocean.339 However, any state-level legislation
designed to spur offshore wind energy development needs to (1) cautiously
streamline the permitting process for wind project applicants, (2) enhance the
existing RPS by significantly raising the statewide renewable energy goal and
incorporating additional market-based incentives to support project
development, and (3) provide for the restructuring and modernization of the
state‘s electric grid. By embracing the most promising elements of the
modern European scheme into its existing regulatory framework, Wisconsin
can honor its cherished motto340 and seize on a singular opportunity to
develop and implement the most innovative renewable energy system in the
Great Lakes region.
MARVIN C. BYNUM II*

338. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
339. See discussion supra Parts II.A and IV.B.2.
340. ―Forward.‖ WIS. STAT. § 1.07 (2007–2008).
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